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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
The purpose or this thesis is to present an 
exposition and interpretation or Jean-Paul Sartre' s con-
cept of freedom, as expressed in his major philosophical. 
writings. This purpose will call for consideration o£ 
the relationship between freedom and some of Sartre' s 
other basic phenomenological and ontological evncepts. 
2. Limitations 
Three limitations of the thesis should be noted. 
First, the thesis will not ba concerned 'With Sartre' s 
literary works.1 It is concerned with Sartre, the 
1. Robert; Champigny's book, S;tages on Sartre's \'ljy 
(Bloomington: Indiana UniverS! tyPress, 1959 , is 
devoted entirely to an examination of Sartre' s major 
literary work from 193$-1952. This book offers an 
excellent commentary on various moral questions and 
imagery found in Sartre's literary t-rork. However. 
since. this mrk 1 s central study is the literary Sa.rtre, 
it cbes not provide the exact philosophical. de.fini-
tions of Sartre' s concepts with lmich this thesis is 
concerned. On the other hand, the book offers en-
lightening comment, on Sartre' s literary existentialism. 
An entire chapter is devoted to the concrete pattern 
o£ imagery which Champigny uncovers in Being~ 
Nothingness. 
l 
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philosopher, the author o£ Being ,mll! Nothingness, 1 !h! 
Transcendence 2! !b.!~ 2 and occasionally with ~ 
Emotions.) !!!!. Pueholog;y 2t Imaginat1on,4 and, the essay, 
"Existent18.lism."5 Beip,s and Noehingness and !b.!!, Transcendence 
.2L the~ are no~ only Sartre's major phil.osophical M)rka, 
but they contain tha necessary ground\Crk and presuppositions 
:for an understanding of all. the philosophical concepts found 
in the rest o! Sartre's works, both literary and philo-
so,pbical. • Sartre' s concept of .freedom is treated most 
extensively in Being ~ Nothinmes§. 
Second, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
present either a detailed account of the origins o£ 
l. 
2. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Beii* and NothinFcess, trans. by 
H. E. Barnes (Ne\'1 Yorf l'liiiosophca:I Library, 1956). 
Jean-Paul Sartre1_ The Transcmdt.noa of the E~o, trans. by Williams and Kirkpatrick (Uew lorlrr ""1'he oonday 
Pres5, 1957). . 
Jean-Paul. Sartre, The Emotions., trans. by B. Frechtman 
{New York: Philosophica:L Library, 1948). An excellent 
discussion o£ Sartre's theory of ~~tion may be £ound 
in Anders-Stern, Guenther, "Emotions and Reality (In 
Connection with Sartre's 'The Emotions')," Phil. and 
Phen. Research, X (1950), 553.,.562; and Marjorie Grene, 
Sartre's Theory o£ Emotions, n Yale French Studies, Vol. 
1 (194$}. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, ~ Psychologz of Im@eination (!.Jew 
York: Philosophical Library, 1948T. '.1his edition does 
not ackna.~ledge a tral'l.sla:tor. · 
5. Jean-Paul Sart.re, "Existentialism.,~,n in Existentialism 
~ Hmnan EmQtions, trans. by B • .!!rechtman (Ner'l lork; 
Philosophical Library, 1957), PP• 9-51. 
( 
Sartre's phenomenological method or an historical develop-
ment o£ the phenomenological movement. Thus it will not 
deal with the phenomenology o£ Edmund Husserl. £rom which 
much of Sa.-rotre1 s phenomenology is derived, or with pre-
Husserlian pheoomenologr. Any remarks about or interpre-
tation o£ Rus serl' s phenomenology will be made from Sartre' s 
point of view. Sartre' s phenomenology will be drawn upon 
· only to the extent that 1 t bears on the examination or 
Sartre's concept of .freedom. 
Third, the texts used in this thesis .for the ex-
position of Sartre's thought are the English translations 
from the French. 
3. l-1ethodology 
Any attempt to understand Sartre' s concept of 
.freedom requires consideration of the relation between 
freedom and some o:f 3artre' s ether phenomenological and 
ontological concepts; the mea.."ling of .freedom pervades 
several o.f these concepts. And the attempt to understand 
any of these concepts requires a suspension of much tradi-
tional definition and terminology and the acceptance and 
familiarity with Sartre's own terminology. Therefore, 
much of' this thesis is given over to analytic: exposition and 
definition of Sartr.e's technical and special vocabulary. 
The "other'• concepts under consideration are those relating 
specifi cal.ly to Sartre' s notion o£ consciousness. To 
3 
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explore and make e:<plicit the fundamental structures of 
Sartre' s theory of OJnsciousness is to take the .front 
door into an understanding of Sartre' s concept o£ freedoD'i. 
Chapter II is an attsnpt to clear the path to Sartre' s 
concept or freedom by sweeping clear some traditiona1 no-
tions of .freedom. This leaves t.he way open for a discus-
sion of Sartre1 s arlstential theory o:f consciousness in 
Chapter III. Consciousness, however, cannot be .fully 
understood until it is contrasted 1.-li. th all that i"Thich is 
not, consciousness. Chapter IV attempts to define what 
S.artre mea.'ls by that W1 ich is not consciousness. Although 
it is diffic:1.1lt to discuss Sartre' s interpretation o£ that 
\"lhich is not consciousness without reference to that t.'ihich 
is consciousness and vice-versa, it is felt that a separate 
cr.apter sh-:)uld be devoted to that \vhich is not conscious-
ness in order to heighten Sartre's emphasis upon the dis-
tinction betweEn these t"WO realms. Therefore, an analysis 
of that which is not. consciou34"1e ss is gi van a chapter of 
its own, and this chapter is significantly placed between 
two ehapt.ers devoted almost entirely to an analysis of' con-
sciousness. Chapter V concrete~y defines the .fundam~ntal 
structures o.f consciousness, thus preparing the way for an 
identification of .freedom with certain o.f these structures. 
Chapter VI is predominantly de.finitional and evaluative. 
4 
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Section one deals with tw:J separate meanings which the 
author or this thesis assigns to Sart.re' s concept ot 
:freedom. Section t'\10 i..'lterpret.s and evaluates two criti-, 
eisms which Wilf'rid Desan urges against Sartre' s concep't 
of .freedom. A final section has been devoted to a syst--
atie reecrding o.f: the conclusions of th a thesis regarding 
Sartre' s cone ept of freedom. 
5 
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CHAPTER II 
\VHAT FREEDm-1 IS NOT 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the 
meaning ot Sartre' s concept of freedom can be gotten only 
a.f'.ter a thorough examination of consciousness. To de-
scribe freedom and consciousness concretely at this point 
would be anticipating the purpose of the rest o£ the thesis. 
Here, however, it is possible to clear the path a bit by 
explaining in general terms what Sartre's freedom is not 
and by indicating a few popular, general, and vague uses 
of the te~. 
1. External Freedom 
Near the close o£ World \'lar_ II Sartre said, 
Never \·lere we freer than under the German Occu-
pation. We 'bad lost all our rights, and .first, ot al.l. 
our right to speak. They insulted us to our faces 
every day--and we had to hold our tongues. They de-
ported us en masse--as workers, as Jews, as political 
prisoners.--EverY\Jhere,--upon the walls, in the press, 
on the screen-, --\i'e found that filthy and insipid image 
of ourselves which the oppressor wished to present to 
us. And because of all this, we l'lera .free.~ 
"Never were !:!!_ freer than under the German Occupation." 
At first glance this is a strange usa o£ the word freedom, 
1. Jea."l.-Paul Sartre, "The Republic., of Silence" ("Paris 
Alive"), Atlantic Nonthly, 174 (1944) 39. 
6 
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or its derivative freer. It is a strange use because, in 
time of war or upheaTal, one usually considers hia freedom 
as limited and controlled by the oppressing .force; one ia 
not free to act in the manner which he has bem accustomed. 
When Sartre says, "NeYer were we freer. tt he is implying 
that the French were more free (or "freer") when they had 
their freedom taken away. This statement is not meant to 
be a con-tradiction, nor is Sartre talking in riddles. What 
is needed is an exact definition or Sartre' s word "freer" 
and a sta'tement- or the way the word "freedom" functions in 
the above context. 
The freedom that was denied the French during the 
war was, what we have preferred to call, external freedom. 
In one sense, external .freedom refers to one's practical 
• 
activity, the ability to do a certain thing. It may also 
refer to the success of that which one has chosen, the 
ability to obtain what one desires. Now Sartre1 s use of 
the word "freer" eliminates the possibility of interpreting 
Sartre's meaning of' freedom in either o£ the above senses. 
First~ it eliminates the possibility of interpreting freedom 
as the ability to do a certain thing. Freedom, for Sartre, 
does not mean the lack of physical restraint or political. 
repression. If' it were, then Sartre l«<Juld be talking in 
riddles. Rastraint, political or physical, was certainly 
characteristic of the pattern of life during the German 
"· 
7 
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occupation in France. Yet Sartre is claiming tha~ the 
political oppressions, the lif' a in the underground, the 
tortures, and the deaths, are precisely the kind o£ 
restraints that makes one more free rather· than less free. 
The kind of restraint, the lack of treed011, during the 
Occupation, was characterized by its externality; it is 
the lack of freedom from the outside 1 from the naturd or 
physical and social world. It is the lack of freedom 
imposed upon man by an other. 
The same pattern of reasoning will show that Sartre's 
use of the 'WOrd "freer" eliminates the possibility of in-
terpreting his meaning of freedom as the ability to obtain 
what one has chosen. "0btainingn suggests external suc-
cess, that is, reaching the goal to which one's choice is 
directed. The Germans externally thwarted many a Frenchman's 
attempt to successfully undermine the German invasion and 
occupation. 
From these ran arks a very simple, but basic conclu-
sion may be drawn. The meaning ar.d significance or the word 
freedom for Sartre will be found only by an examination o£ 
the internal context; that is, it will be from the internal 
dimension o£ man that a positive definition o£ freedom will 
emerge. It may be stated that Sartre' s only concern with 
external freedom, or the lack of it, is in its ability to 
( 
individualize, develop, and further the other and more 
important kind of freedom. 
2. Internal Freedom 
This "other kind ot freedom" refers to man 1 s choices 
or man's nature or, in short 1 man 1 s inward condition. We 
can approach this other kind of freedom by examining an 
implication of the phrase "f'reedoa to choose." This impli-
cation is that freedom to choose means the lack or a deter-
mining motive in an act of choice. That is, that man has 
the capacity or ability to choose or not choose whatever he · 
pleases. that man's choices are not determined for him; in 
short, there is no determining motive. 
The meaning o£ a determining motive may be illus-
trated by what happens when one is faced with picking up a 
hot pan from a stove. One chooses to use a pot-holder to 
lift the pan rather than the bare hand so as not to get 
burned. The antici. pated consequences, either f'avorabla or 
unfavorable~ become the motive which determines one's choice 
of using the pot-holder. When a government uses capital 
pu.'lishment it is hoping it will serve as a deterrent for 
\'Irong-doing. One's £reedoin in choosing possible alternatives, 
then, may be determined, or partly determined, by the £ear, 
or love, of external consequences. The fear or love is an 
9 
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internal motiYe.1 And it is the lack o£ this internal. 
motive which constitutes, what we have called, intemal. 
freedom. 
The lack ot intemal. motives constitutes what baa 
often been called a "free will." The question which now 
must be asked is whether the lack ot internal motives is 
what Sartret' means by .freedom and whether this lack ot in-
ternal motiYes constitutes a ".free will." For purposes or 
illustration we shall look at one internal motivation, 
namely, t~e emotions as a determinisUc activity, and ask 
whether a lack of these emotions nr a separation ot them 
from the "will" constitutes a "free will," or, more 
appropriately in the Sartrian context, freedom. 
i. PsychologY and Emotion 
~, I 
'./ 
A psychologist who believes that the emotions deter-
mine our choices finds no separation or break between the 
decision to act and the act it self. As Sartre phrases it, 
"the motive provokes the act as the physical cause the 
1. Why and how external consequences become internal. 
motives in man's choosing lends itsel.f to more de-
tailed analysis than we have space for here. ',fuy 
these are not adequate motives ror Sartra will be-
come clear as 'tte progress. 
10 
I 
\·J 
' 
( 
e!£ec:t·~ "l Sartre rejects this deterministic position for 
two reasons. And tha rejection itself is crucial for an 
underst~ding or his position. 
Sartre £eels that 
the ultimate meaning or d~terminism is to estab-
lish within us an unbroken continuity of existence 
in it self. The motive co nc ei Yed as a psychic fact--
i. e. 1 as a full. and givm reality--is, in the de-
terministic view, articulated without any break 
with the decision and the act, both ~£ 'Which are 
equally conceived as psychic givens. 
The word emotion may be substituted for the word motiTe 
here. It results in the same claim £or Sartre. That is 1 
to conceive or tha emotions as deterministic psychic givens 
or facts leaves no room between the decision and the act. 
The emotions would penetrate one's psychical structure and 
determine one's consciousness and action. This sort of 
ll 
interpretation of motive and act leaves absolutely no room -
for any kind of freedom.) 
To save freedom Sartre rejects this deterministic 
view and he rejects the so-called "internal motives" simply 
1. Sartre, Being 1!:!lS! ?lothingness, p. 440. 
2. Ibid. ~,The term, "existence-in-itsel.t," in this quota-
tion is on a of Sartre' s very special tech.'lical terms. 
"Existen ce-in-itsel.frt may be identified with another 
or Sartra's special terms, "being-in-itsal£." Being-
in-itself is introduced and discussed in Chapter IV. 
3. There is one exception to this statement. Freedom might 
be interpreted as acting accordu1g to certain determina-
tions, acting accord! ng to what one is, or acting accord-
ing to one sort of motive or another. This conception 
will ba discussed in Chapter VI. 
( 
because they result in a deterministic view, which, in 
turn, leaves no room tor freedom. But Sartre's ultimate 
motiYe fbr rej ect.ing determinism rests upon his acceptance 
or something else. This something else is his conception 
or "motives• as something which cannot act as a determin~ 
istic actirtty. First we will look at Sartre's claim that/ 
the emotiOns are nat a "motivating" or deterDiinistic _j 
act.ivity and then see whether this view results in the 
notion of a ~tree will.~ 
Psychology, says Sartre, draws its material from 
"only two types of well defined experiences, that which 
gives us the spatial-temporal. perception of organized 
bodies, and the intuitive knowledge of ourselves that is 
called reflexive experience. nl But whatever its method 
its material or data are racts; and our investigation here 
is concerned with the fact o£ emotion. 2 The psychologist, 
Sartre feels, is interested in more than just assembling 
and accumulating facts. As a scientist he is interested in 
1. Sartre, ~ Emotions, P• 1. 
2. Sartre defines a fact as "that which one should meet in 
the course of an investigation" (Sartre, ~ Emotions, 
p. 2). Sartre's usa of the word meet here is a bit un-
clear. He may mean one of two things. First, that the 
fact of e~otion is ~he unreflective meetin~ of an empir-
ical phenomenon, i.e., undergoing (meeting) the process 
of emotion itsel£, or, second, that the £act of e~otion 
is the bracketed, i.e.~ reflected, process of emotion. 
l'2 
The latter, which might be called the nre.t"'lected meeting,. !t 
is possible, and, to be sure, the very condition which 
( 
( 
accumulating facts 1 but since this in itself does not 
bring a .full and useful science of pSychology he becomes 
interested in interpreting and synthesi.ing these £acts. 
But he does not concern himself with examining the struc-
tures which make possible these facts, except where he 
has moved over into "meta-psychology." 
As for~ studying the possible conditions of an emo-
tion, that is 'imndering whether the very structure 
of human reality makes emotions possible and ~ it 
makes them possible, that .would appear useless and 
absurd to a psychologist: what good is it to ask 
whether emotion is possible precisely because it is?l 
Yet Sartre does not attempt to 
seek the explanation or the laws of emotion in the 
general and essential str.1ctures of human reality, 
but !.!l the processes 2£ ~ emotion itself, with 
the result that even when it has been duly described 
and explained it \'rill never be anything but one .fact 
among others, a fact closed on itself' \thich will 
nevdr per~it either of understanding a thing other 
than itself or of grasping by means of it the essen-
tial reality of man.2 
Sartre 1.dll in neither case, then, be guilty o:f' post hoc 
ergo prooter !!2.£,, because, aa will be discovered, the .fact 
or emotion which appears or vrhich we meet as .fact does not 
lend it self to a disco-ITery o.f its essence or any other 
essence and the fact as fact is not an explanatory principle. 
makes Sartre's phenomenological method possible. The 
following section develops briefly tP~ idea o.f bracket-
ing of empirical phenomenon and Sartre's phenomenolo-
gical method. 
1.. Sartre., The .Emotions, p. 7 .. 
2. Ibid., p. 9. 
13 
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~'lhy an emotion is, how it is, and what it is cannot be 
explained by collecting and isolating several emotions 
and then analyzing them. An emotion is and will ranain 
one .fact among many. Sartre feels that his phenomenological 
method alleviates the inadequacy of beginning an inquiry 
with facts. 
ii. Phenomenology and Emotion 
What are emotions other than simply facts, yet 
.facts by which nothing else can be interpreted? Why does 
Sartre "isolate" facts or emotions so that antocedent 
activity and actions cannot be interpreted in terms of 
them? Simply to "isolate" facts does not prove to us why 
a fact or emotion is not the cause of a particular action. 
It still could very well be. Sartre has simply told us 
that the previous methods used to investigate facts have 
been inadequate, that essences, which will explain why an 
emotion is possible, are not found by begining with an 
analysis of emotion, and that an emotion, once explained, 
will not shed any explicable light upon other emotions. But 
this is something other than saying that an emotion is not 
the cause of a particular activity. What is needed, then, 
is an adequate method which will lead to some sort of ontol-
ogical position Which will show that an emotion is or is not 
the cause of a particular activity, and if it is not• then 
14 
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what sort of ontological status does it have in relation 
to the rest or human activity. 
The £ollold.ng quotation is an introductory state-
ment by Sartre of ·his phenoaenological. method: 
\'lithout g1 ving up the idea of experience (the 
principle of phenomEilology is to go to "things 
themselves" and the basis of these methods is 
eidetic intuition), it must be made f'lexible and 
must take into account the experience of essences 
and values; it must even recognize that essences 
alone permit us to classify and inspect the facts. 
I£ we did not have implicit recourse to the 
essence of emotion, it would be impossible for us 
to distinguish the particular group or facts or 
emotivity among the mass o£ psychic facts. Since 
one has had implicit recourse to the essence of 
emo·tion as well, phenomenology will therefore 
prescribe that we have explicit recourse to it 
and, by concepts, that we set up the content o:r 
this essence once and for all •••• Psychology, 
considered as a science of certain human facts, 
could not be a beginning because the psychic facts 
~1e meet are never the first one. They are, in their 
essential str~cture, man's reactions against the 
world •••• If we wish to found a psychology, we 
shall have to go beyond the psychic, source of man, 
the w:>rld, and the psychic: the transcendenta1 and 
the consecutive consciousness which we attain by 
"phenomenological reduction" or "putting the world 
in parentheses.n1 
Sartre' s method is clearly indicated by the above. 
ttPhenomenology is the study of: phenomena--not facts. And 
by phenomenon must be understood 'that which manifests 
1. Ibid., pp. 10-ll. nHusserl," says Sartre, "has shown 
hc¥'1 an eidetic reduction is al"'.i'ays possible; that is, 
how one cm always pass beyond tha concrete phenomenon 
to\iard its essence" ( Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 
p. 1). - -
15 
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itself•' that whose reality is appearance.nl Since 
phenomenology 
seeks not facts but significations, it w11l abandon 
the methods o£ inductive introspection or external 
empirical observation to seek2only to grasp and £ix the essence o:t phenomena. 
A phenomenology o:t emotion, then, is necessary to arrive 
at the essence of emotion. A. pheDOmenology of emotion 
will "put the world in parentheses" and then "study emo-
tion as a pure transcendental phenomenon." !~ow one will 
study emotion (''in the processes of the emotion itsel:t"). 
But, says Sartre, this will not be done by "turning to 
particular emotions but by seeking to attain and eluci-
date the transcendontal essence of emotion as an organ-
ized type of consciousness.n3 In the essential structure 
or consciousness we shall find the key t.o the transcen-
dental essenee of emotion. A phenomenological description 
of emotion will shed soma light upon the essential struc-
ture of consciousness, "since an emotion is precisely a 
consciousness.ff It would be most accurqte to say that a 
phenomenological description of emotion is, in part, a 
description of the structure of consciousness since 
1. Sartre, The Emotions~ p. 14. 
2. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
J. ~., p. 12. 
\_\J 
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emotion is consciousness itsel£ iii the form of emotion. 
Emotion, says Sartre, 
has its essence, its particular structures, its 
laws of appearing, and its signification. It 
cannot coma to- human reality .from th!! outside. 
On the contrary, it is man whO assumes his emo-
tion, and consequentJ.y et;10tion is an organized 
form of human existED ee.l. 
One thing is clear, an emotion is not something added to 
consciousness from the outside. It is not a thing which 
affixes itsel.f to consciousness and determines its choices. 
Rather, emotion is something which consciousness chooses 
or "assumes.~ The structure of consciousness, then, must 
be such that it will allow consciousness to choose its 
mode of living in the world. Freedom cannot be further 
understood without probing Sartre' s theory o£ conscious-
ness) to which we will turn in Chapter III. Here, however, 
it must be understood that emotion is not adequate as a 
deterministic activity or motivating :force in the activity 
of consciousness. 
iii. Free Will and Consciousness 
Earlier it \fas asked whether Sartre's view of the 
17 
emotions as not a motivatin6 or deterministic activity re-
sults in the concept of a "free will" ror hL~. At this 
point it can be said that Sartre rejects this interpreta't.ion 
( 
of a ":tree will" for two reasons. One o.f the reasons 
is given by Sartre in the following quotation: 
There is a .fairly common tendency to seek to 
identify free acts with voluntary acts and to 
restric~ the deterministic explanation to the 
wor~d of the passions. • • • In this case it 
would be necessary to conceive of man as simul-
taneously !'ree and determined. and the essential 
problem would be that or the relations between 
this unconditioned freedom and the determined 
processes of the psychic li£e; h9w will it 
utilize them for its own benefit?L 
Such a concept Sartre will not accept. Man not only "can 
not be sometimes slave and sometimes frea1 "2 but ha cannot 
be somewhere slave and somewhere free. Otherwise a duality 
would exist "at the heart of the psychic uni~y. n3 
Ho\-t in fact could we conceive of a being which 
could be one and which nevertheless on the one 
hand would be constituted as a series of acts de-
termined by one another--hence existents in ex-
teriority--and W'lich on the other hand would be 
constituted as a spontaneity det~rmining itself' 
to be and revealing only itsel£?4 
Sartre wishes to save the unity of the psychic structure• 
To oppose· a free "will" to a series o£ determined psychic 
events not only destroys the unity of consciousness, but 
it sets up, according to Sartre, an inconceivable working 
dualism. How, asks Sartre, could a .f"ree will. modi.fy or 
1. Sartre, Bein.g .and :r.tothingness, p. 441.. 
2. Ibid., 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
lS 
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affect a series of prese~t determined facts which by 
definition are and can only be what they are?l 
The second reason Sartre rejects the notion o£ 
a "free will" is simply a matter of datinition. The will, 
.for Sartre, is not something other than consciousness; 
on the contrary, the will and consciousness are one and 
the same thing for him. Thus the remarks aboYe which 
applied to a .free will likewise apply to a free conscious-
ness. If Sartre is going to conceive of a consciousness 
uhich is free, it will not nhave" its i"reedom in the sense 
that it stands opposed to a series of determined facts 
which cannot affect consciousness. And i£ consciousness 
cannot affect the determined facts then consciousness 
should not be defined as free. Since Sartre does not 
conceive of a series of determined or determining facts 
at the heart o£ the psychic structure, then he may very 
well conceive of a free consciousness. But it would be 
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more proper for Sartre to speak of consciousness .!:!. free, 
rather than a free consciousness, since the latter suggests 
a "freed" consciousness, i.e., some determining structure 
standing opposed to consciousness and something which con-
sciousness should be able to modify if it is to be called 
free. 
1. ~-
( 
3. Summary 
From tha foregoing considerations these Sl.UIIIIIarY 
statements m.ay be drawn. First, a definition of Sartre1 s 
concept of' .fraedom will not be .found by examining the 
notion of" external. freedom. Sartre 1 s notion o£ .freedOm 
cannot be understood b7 the popular conception that .free-
dom means the lack o£ political, physical, or social. 
I'estrai...'"lt. Secondly, the term freedom is intimately 
bound up with Sartre' s conception of consciousness. 
Thirdly, Sartre9 s phenomenolo~J is not only a method 
which describes the facts '!.'lhich. appear to consciousness, 
but. a description of the fact of' emotion is a description, 
in part, of the fact of consciousness itself. Fourthly, 
20 
a consciousness or a will which is free is, first, !'ree 
because no determining motives affect the activities o~ 
consciousness and, second, consciousness is able to choose 
the nmotives" ~ich it pleases. Consciousness ia £ree from 
determined and determining psychical. .facts, but only by an 
analysis of the essential structure of consciousness can it 
be knmm vmat it means ~ choose the \>Ia-:f we want to ~ive in 
the world. In other words, it nust now be discovered what 
the structure of consciousness must be in order t['t..at freedom 
is not simply interpreted as a freedom ~rom. 
(' . . -, 
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CHAPTER III 
FREEDOM AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
The preceding chapter has shown that Sartre•s 
concept ot freedom cznot be underst,ood without a further 
analysi a of the fundamental structures or consciousness. 
This analysis Sartre gi. ves in considerable detail. 1n .I,a 
Transcendence 2!, £b..!. Ego. In this chapter we shall. 
examine Sartre•s phenomenological theory of consciousness. 
Sartre's phenomenological conclusions in this 
work are set forth positively only after his rejection of 
two other positions, namely, "the theory of the formal 
presence of the !." and "the theory of the material presence 
of the Me." 
For most philosophers the ego is an "inhabitant" ot 
consciousness. Some affirm its formal. presence at 
the heart ot Erlebnisse. as an empty principle o£ 
unification. Others--psychologists for the most 
part-claim to discover its material presence, as 
the center of desires and acts. in each moment o£ 
our psychic life. "tie should like to show here that 
the ego is neither formally nor materially in con-
sciousness.! 
Sartre is claiming that the view of either the Ego as a 
"formal presence" or as a "material presence" is a des-
criptively inadequate account of the true nature and funct~on 
1. Sartra, The Transcendence of the Ego, P• 31. 
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of consciousness. The !"allowing tW) paragraphs indicate 
Sartret.s interpretation of the theory of' the formal 
presence of the I. 
Sartre suggests that both Kane and Husserl hold 
the theo1"1 ot the formal presence of the !.• According to 
Sartre, Kant is not concerned with proving the existence 
or the !. but in looking for the conditions which make 
possible our experience. Sartre says that he agrees with 
Kant that the existence ot the !. does not need to be praYed 
because it always accompanies all our representations. 
Similarly, says Sartre, Husserl has a transcendental l 
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which stands behind consciousness, and it not only unifies, 
but also individualizes our experience. But why cbes Sartre 
claim that the formal presence of the ! is an "empty prin-
ciple of unification?" What, then, does unify our manifold 
representations if it is not a transcendental! or "perm-
anent seat" standing behind eons ciousness?l 
Sartre agrees with Kat t that the ! ~JDUst be able 
to accompany all our representations," but, he asks, "does 
1. We have not suggested here that the "material Me" might 
be the principle or unification simply. because sartre 
rejects this theory .for the sane reason he does the 
theory o:f the fonnal presence of the I. Both the I and 
the~ are permanent seats standing behind consciousness. 
Sartre states that the material !!!!. is a "magnetic pole" 
or "reference to mysel.f" for all my acts. The me acts 
as an end, the object as a means. "The me seekS! ••• to 
procure the object in order to satisfy its desire" (Sartre, 
The Transcendence 2!. ~ Ego, P• 55). 
( 
2.3 
it in fac~ accompany them?"l And ftlrther, if, in f'act, i~ 
does ac.company them, c:bes this necessarily mafte the!. the 
unifying principle? Is Kant's original synthetic unity ot 
'· 
apperception the condition of the !.' e presmce in conscious-
ness or is it the !. which actually cbes the synthesising of 
our manifold repr-esentations? Must we, asks Sartre, "con• 
clude that an I in fact inhabits all our states of' conscious-
-- . 
ness and actual.J.y effects the supreme synthesis of our 
e~erience?•2 First, "to solve the problem o£ the existence 
in fact of the I in consciousness, we 13eet on our patb the 
phenomenology of Hll3serl~"3 Husserl 1 s phenomenology intro-
due es the concept of the "Intentionality of Consciousness," 
and it is this coxx: apt by l'lhich Sartre justi!'ia s his start-
ing point. 
l. Intentionality o.f Consciousness 
Since "consciousness is defined by 1ntentionality"4. 
Sartre does not need an .! which uni.fies and individualizes. 
l. 
2. 
Sartre, The Transcendence o£ the ~ P• 33. See also 
Immanuel--xa:'n't, Crltt:;ue oflfureReason, translated by 
Norman Kemp Smith (ndOiir MacmliLUi & Co. Ltd., l95S), 
B 134 (p. 153). .· 
Ibid., P• 32. 
Ibid., P• 35. 
See Sartre' s definition in ~ Transcendence 9.£. ~ Ego, 
p. 38, a~d Being ~ Nothingness, p. lxiii. 
( 
By intentionality consciousness transcends itsel.f • It 
unifies itself by escaping from 1tsel.f."1 An intentional 
consciousness is al\-~ays consciousness .2!: something. 
This means that there is no consciousness which is 
not a positing of a transcendent object• • • • that 
consciousness has no·"content." A table is not in 
consciousness. • •• A "table is in space, beside-
the window, ~to. All consciousness is positional 
in that it transcends itself in order to reach an 
object 1 and it exhausts it sel.f in this same positing. 
All that there is of intention in my actua.J. conscious-
ness is dir9cted toward the outside, toward the table; 
all my judgments or practical activities, all my 
present inclinations tra~scend therns~lves; they aim 
at the table and are absorb9d in it.G 
Consciousness, then, is intentional and points w an object 
which is something ot!'-..er than itself. And it is .!!! this 
pointing or "escaping" that consciousness unifies itsel.f, but 
it is in the tra.."'lscencient object that we :find this unity o£ 
consciousness. "The object is transcendent to the con-
sc:!.ousnesses vJhich grasp it, and it is in the object that 
the unity o£ the consciousness is found.~3 1lhile the Qnity 
of' consciousness is found in its transcendent object, the 
individuality of consciousness is rooted in the very nature 
of co~ciousness. "Consciousness can be limited only by 
itself. "4 If we think· of consciousness in this marmer the 
1. Sartre, The Transcendence of ~ Ego, p. )8. 
2. Sartre, Being ~ Nothingness, p. liii-liv. 
3 ~ Sartre 1 .T..b.!! Trm1scendenc e E.f ~ :Sgo, p. 38. 
4. Ibid., p. 39. 
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! becomes a manifestation ot this consciousness rather 
than its condition. Hence, Sartre's ~phenomenological 
conception of consciousness renders the unif'ying and 
individualising role of the I totally usel.ess."l . It ia 
. -
tor this reason that# Sartre considers the formal presence 
of the! an "empty principle or ~ication." 'l'he I is 
-
no longar the subject which predicates consciousness; con-
sciousness itself' becomes the eondi tiort for unification 
and individualization o£ experience. T~e first cardinal 
activity of consciousness, then, is that since conscious-
ness is intentional it effects its O\in unification by "in-
tending" its objects; it is in the "intending" that it ·~· 
unifies itself, and it is in the intended or transcendent 
object that this uni£ication is manifested. It can be said 
that "intentionality" is the "constitutive structure of 
consciousness."2 
Sartre has defined consciousness as intentionality; 
"all oonsciousnes3 is consciousness .9.! something.") But 
before we examine the condition mich allows consciousness 
1. Ibid., P• 40. 
2. The translators of The Transcendence of the Ego have 
quite appropriately-spQken of consciousness as "a 
spontaneity, a sheer activity transcending toward 
objects" ("Translator's Introduction," p. 21). 
3. Sartre, Being~ Nothingqess, p. liii) 
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to be intentional, to be able to transcend it salt, to 
be always consciousness of something• it will. be help.tul. 
to point out the distinction Sartre makes between re• 
.flective consciousness-and unreflective or pre-re.tlective 
2. Re.flective and Pre-reflective Consciouaneaa 
The only necessary condition tor the existence of 
consciousness is that it became aware of itselr, and neon• 
. 
sciousness is aware of itsell' insofar as it is conscious---:- - - ....... ......,.. _____ ___ 
ness g! a transcendent object. nl But £or consciousness 
to be aware of itself, i.e. 1 consciousness ot conscious-
ness, it does not need to posit itself as a transcendent 
object. At this level consciousness is not characterized 
by "intentionali~,n it is "non-positional." 
Consciousness is not £or itsel£ its awn object. 
Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is 
why consciousness posits and rnasps the object in 
the sane act. Consciousness nows itself' only as 
absolute inwardness. We shall call. such a con-
sciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or 
unreflected conseiousness.2 
- . . 
Every conscious existence exists as consciousness 
of existing •••• The first consciousness o£ con-
sciousness is not positional; ••• because it is 
one with the consciousness of mich it is conscious-
ness.3 
]... Sartre, ~ Transcendence 9.!: ~ ~ p. 40. 
2. J~ •• p. 41. 
3. Sartre, Being~ Nothingness, P• l.iv. 
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The first. stage of consciousness, then, is consciousness 
of existing, which in turn establishes an existing con-
seiouaness. This eonaciousnass or existing Sartre terma 
"unreflect.ed" consciousness; un.retlected because it "is 
not for its~ its own objee-t.lf 
Unreflected or pre-reflective consciousness, then, 
does not admi:t to intentionality. !o say that pre-
re.flective consciousness is intentional muld be to say 
t~t it was consciousness of consciou3ness; the latter 
con:aciousness ~uld be a1·1 object for the for1!lar conscious-
ness. This would place the object consciousness !n. space, 
.!n. the world. Consciousness would be at the same time 
inside i tsel£ am outside itself. It would be for itself 
its own object. 
Th1 s would be a complete consciousness directed 
toward something which is not it; that is, toward 
consciousness as object of re.flection.. It would 
then transcend i t.selt and like the positional con-
sciousness or the \'JOrld would be exhausted 1n aim-
ing at its object. But that object would be itself' 
a consciousness.l 
The pra-re!leet;ive consciousness is known or is aware of 
itsel.f by what. Sartra terms an "absolute inwardness."2 
1. Ibid •• p. liv. 
2. Sartre says nothing else to explain what he means by 
the term "absolute inwardness. n It can only be sug-
gested that pre-reflective consciousness is known by 
some sort of irrational, intuitive insight.. Pre-
reflective consciousness "confronts" itsl!l£1 but., and 
this can only be stated, not in the same sense that 
reflective consciousness "confronts" its objects. 
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Retl.ective consciousness~ on the other hand, is 
intentional. This is the consciousness lbich thinks. It 
"is aware of it selt' insof'ar U it !!. consciousnesg 2!, .!. 
transcendm't ob.1ect."l The pre-retlective conaciousnesa 
never becoQ~es. retl~tive. rather it becoaes reflected· 
upon. It is because ot the distinction Sartre finds in 
-
the ordering o£ eonsciousneas that he objects to the 
primacy which Descartes assigned to the cogito. In £act, 
says Sartre, "all writers who have describe~ the Cogito 
have dealt with it as a reflective operation, that is to 
say • as an operation of the second degr~e. tt2 In thia 
sort or operation consciousness would become an object tor 
consciousness. But when the Cogi. to is e.ff'ected 1 maintains 
Sartre, this is not what happens; the reflectiv~ conscious-
ness does not become its own object. Rather, and this is 
precisely what he objects to in Descartes• formula, "the 
consciousness which says! fh1nk is precisely·not the con-
sciousness which thinks, n) or as Hazel Barnes:-: puts it, 
nthe consciousness which SB¥S1 1I am,' is not actually the 
consciousness which thinks.''4 The consciousness which 
1. Sartre, .Ih2. Transcendence E!, ~Ego. P• 40. 
2. Ibid., P• 44. 
3. Ibid., P• 45. 
4. "Translator's Introduction, n Bei.ng ~ Nothingness, 
p. x. 
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thinks belongs to the second order;· it is reflective con-
sciousness and, therefore, does not deserYe the primacy 
which Deseart.es and others have assigned it. "It is 
' 
obvious,'* concludea .Sartre, "that Descartes passed £roll 
the Cogi to to ·the idea ot thinldng substance because he 
believed that I and think are on the S8'lle lavel."l 
. -
Since all eons ci.oU1tneas is intentional it "is 
directed to~d the outside," toward an object. HoweYar6 
"not all consciousness is knowledge, but all kncndng con• 
sciousness can be knowledge onJ.y of ita·object.n2 
The necessary and sufficient condition for a know-
ing consciousness to be knowledge .Q.{ its object, is 
that it be consciousness of' itself' as being that 
knowledge ••• • 1 If Dr/ consciousness were not con-
sciousness of' being consciousness o£ the table, it..r' 
would then be con3eiousness of' t.'"lat table without 
consciousness of being so. In other wcrds. it. would 
be a consciousne~s ignorant of itself, an uncoa.soious--
which is absurd.J 
Consciousness of eonsciousne ss does noe mean th~t "t"'t 
know is to know tlat one knows." Rather, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
it is the non-reflecti"''e consciousness lilich render-s 
the re.flection poss:t. ble; there is a pre-re£lect"ive 
cogito ~ich is the condition or the Cartesian eotito. 
At the same time it is the non-thetic consciousness 
or counting which is the very cnndition of rq act of 
adding. • • • Thus in order to count, it is necessary 
to be conscious o£ count1ng.4 
Sartre, The Transcendence 2f. .E!.! Ego, p. 50~ 
Sartre, Ba1n:7 and Nothingness, lZ- P• liv. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. lv 
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The !.1 for S.artre,. only appears "on-the occasion of a re-
flectiYe act;n put negatively, the pre-reflective con-
sciousne ss 1 s non.-personal.. The r appears or comes into 
- -·< 
enstance only a.tter the pre•retlect1ve consciousness baa 
_bem reflected upon, 1. e., "has been made the object o£ 
reflection." The ! baa been taken out of consciousness, 
which leaves the latter as an absclute• non-personal, un-
re.tlective existent. The !. or Ego becomes an objeet !9r. 
consciousness as any other object; it is out there in the 
-
l'iorld. "There is never an Ego-consciousness but only con-
sciouane ss f?.l. the Ego"~ nl The Ego has its beginning and 
its place on the reflective level of consciousness just as 
the non-personal life has its beginning and its place on 
the pre-reflective level of consciousness. ~he Ego is 
an object apprehended, but. also an object constituted, by 
reflective consciousness.n2 
.3. The Significance of Intentionality and Freedom 
Sartre's concept of the intentionality of conscious-
ness is crucial in his rejection of a transcendental Ego 
which uni.fies and individualizes. The first important 
activity of consciousness is this intentionality. Sartrets 
rej ecti.on o£ the tb oory or a transcendental Ego shows how 
1. "Translator's Introduction,n Baing~ Nothingness, 
P• Y.i. 
2. Sartre, .!h2, Transcendence g.£.~ Ego, p. 80. 
__ ! 
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far he is willing to go with the concept o£ intentionality. 
Not only is consciousness always consciousness or an ob-
jeet1 which it "posits," in the world, and "grasp a," bu't 
the Ego becomes an object tor consciousness l.ike any other 
object; it is out ia· the world. 
In Cha~er. II it was pointed out that emotion is 
not something add«l4 to con:sciou.sce~s trom the outside, 
but. that it is somathing which consciousness chooses or· 
"assumes"; th~t conscio1Jsnoss is free to ~~oose the 
"motives" which it pleases. The analysis in this chapter 
has shown that consciousness chooses, i.a .. , posits and 
grasps, its own obj eets~ alld the Ego is one of these ob-
j ecti3. The Ego is not a determining structure just as the 
emot:t ons are not a determining structure. Consciousness, 
t1'!en1 is fJ:ee to choose or "assumett any of its obj acts, 
whether it be ~1 emotion, the B6o, or a chair; it is free 
t.o choose how it wants to live in the ""'rld. It can be 
said that the concept of intentionality is identifiable 
with the notion that consciousness is free to assume ita 
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own -..1a7 o£ living in the W>rld. Intentionality is· "sheer 
activity," and "sheer activity" is thae in which conscious-
ness is engaged woon it chooses or "assumes" its own objects. 
One formulation or pre~inary def1~1tion of free-
dom may be derived fron the claim that consciousness 
chooses, "assumes," or intends its own objects. This 
'- .. 
.. r 
( 
t'"ormulation may be made in tm ways. First, that con• 
sciouaness poasesaea freedom in the sense that it is a 
freedom .froa. It is free tram emotio:tla and f'ree .from a 
transcendenta1 I,.. Second, that f'raedom consists in the 
ability or consciouaness ~choose its ~bjects, i.a •• 
to choose or intend the way it wants to Uve in the world. 
It is .free t.o chooae and it is free to choose precisely 
because of the activity o£ int~tionality. the doctrine 
o~ in·eentionality means that consciousness is always con-
sciousness of something. It is £rae to· choose or to be 
-
aware o:r a tra.l"lscendant Ego or amotion; a transcendental 
Zgo or eootion doas not choose. and effect a consciousness. 
The p~aliminary and first .fomulat.ion or tha mean-
ing of Sartra' a concept of freedom may be summarized as 
.follows: Man or consciousness poasesses a freedom from 
and a fraadom ~· It is a freGdom from in the sensa that 
it is able to c:hooaa or int~nd its own "deterministic 
activity" or its way of living in the world. In short. 
consciousness exareiaes its freedom from anything to 
choose or assume its own anything. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FR~DOM AND BEING IN-ITSELF 
To understand fully the fundamental struc~e 
and activity of consciousness it is necessary to tL'lder-
stand what Sartre means by all ~'lat ;mich is not. con-
sciousness. This could be put in the form of a question: 
\~t is the nature o£ all that which stands opposed to 
consciousness? All that ~mich is not consciousness is 
the transcendent world, of which we spoke in Chapter III. 
Belou \ie w-dll examine the nature of the transcendent ob-
ject and try to discover whether any intelligible rela-
tionship exists between it and consciousness. 
l. Being wnich Is 
There is a bein& o£ the transcendent object. 
Although Sartre calla the transcendent object an appear-
ance or phenomenon, it nevertheless has a being. 
Even if I wiahed to reduce this table to a synthesis 
of subjective impressions, I must at least remark 
that it reveals itself' gua table through this syn-
thesis, that it is the transcendent limit of the 
synthesis, the reason for it and its end. 'rhe table 
is be.fore knowledge and can not be
1
identified with 
the knowledge which we have of it. 
1. SPJtre, Being ~ Nothingpe3s~ p. lix. 
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It is preci3ely because Sartra has -assigned a being to the 
phenomenon.!!.:! phencmenon that he makes the distinction 
bet\i'ee!l the phenomenon of being and the being of the 
phenomenon. !t is crucial to point ou~ that the. being 
o! the phenomenon is not its al)pearlng,. The appearance 
19is as it §!PRears." The "fact that it appears" determines 
and conditions "the being of the phenomenon." Sartre wants 
to escape Berkeley's formula, "Es$e ~ pereipi," and hence 
will not "say that the baing of the appearance is its 
appearing. nl The e.xis'tent, then, is an. appearance; ttthis 
means that it designates itsel£ as an organized totality 
o£ qua.litiss. It designates itself' and not its b-eing. 
Being is simply the condi~ion o£ all revelation~"2 just 
as Kant's thing-in-itsal£1 ultinately, is the condition of 
all axpe.ri ence. Knowledge of the phenomenon o£ being does 
not ·create the being of the phenomenon~ but makes it. 
"appear.nJ 
34 
Sartra 1 s statement that the being of th.a transcenden"C 
cb j ect "is as it a-on ears" is ver-y crucial for understanding 
1. Ibid•, p.~lii. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Wl1at ough~ to be noted here is that Sartre is identify-
ing beir.g a.."'!d S!Xi~tence. Sartre uses the French word 
~tr~ as an e~~~v~l&1t £or both beiug and e~syence, 
rat!!er tha.n '!Zle two French word3, @~re \ bei.ng 1 and 
axis t.:::.1ce { e.--.cist;e.:J.ce) or exister ( t.o be in e;{isten.ea}. 
To be and to exist ara ona a.TJ.d the sa.'Ue thing. 
- . 
~ .................. --------------------~ 
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his claim t:b.at the being of the tr!.ltlscendent object has 
a certain ontolo~~cal priority over consciousness. Sartre 
rests his entire case upon this particular notion, 1. e., 
that the pbenomanon is as it appears.l Sir..ce the being 
or existence o£ the phenomenon is neither reduced to a 
series of n.aubjeetive impressions!~ nor to the knowledge 
which we have of it, Sartre assigns a special term to the 
baing of the phenomenon, namely, !Jtransphenomena1" being. 
"Transphenomenal being!1 is simply another name for the 
being of ~~e phenomenon. Sartre hopes ·to convey by the 
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usa of this term that ~'le being o£ the pheno::IP.non "gives 
itself as already existi!:lg ~,rh en consciousness reveals it."2 
Thus, in a 11transphenomenal:t sense, the being of the phe-
nomsncn has ontolosical priority over consciousness. 
"T~...111sphenomooal being ••• is itsel:f in itself" 
( lui-merne ~ 2.2!) • n) It nis," "is in-itself'>" and nis 
what it is.n4 That "being is" m:aans that it is uncreated. 
"It assu.'lles its being be7o~d th~ creation~n5 That "being 
is in-itst3lf" means it is not the cause of itself and it 
1. See Sartre' s "ontological proof 1 " Bei..~ ~ Hothingness, 
1)P· lxii-~iv. 
2. Ibid,, p. lxiv. 
4. Ibid., p. lviii. 
5. Ibid.~ p. lxvi. 
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is "'neither passivity nor activity." ttThe sel£-consi.stency 
or being is beJond the active as it is beyond the passive.nl 
This does not mean> says Sartre, that being is 
a connection wit!! itself. It is itael£. It is an 
immanence which can not realize itsel£, an a££1l"I!Sa• 
tion which can not ariirm it sel..f, an activity which 
can not. act, because it is glued to it sel..f. ... • • . 
But if being is in itsel.f'~ this means that. it · 
does not rerer to itselr as sal£ consciousne:ss doea. 
It is this. sal£. It is itsel£ so completely that 
the perpetual reflection '11\icb constitutes the self' 
is dissolved in an identity. • .. .. In .fact being is 
opaque to its el£ precisely beeau se it is f"illad 
\d til it self. 2 
In short, the trc-J.'1scendent object possesses a being, and 
tr.is baing is characterized by Sartre as being 'l.mat it is. 
Sartre prr~fers to call a being w-hich is what it is nbeing-
in-itself~' (~tre-en-soi). Being-in-itself is a "pleni-
-.=;;;;;,.;;;o,......,;;.;;;;;.-
tude, n a "r.-1assiv~ full b·:::ing; n. it is everything t."'lat is 
not consciousness. 
2. Existence and Essence 
Sartre defines existentialism as a philosophy 
which believes existence 2recedes essence. An examination· 
of this stateznent will. sharpen and clarify, in part. the 
relationship 1<-hieh exists between conaciousnes3 and being-
in-itsel.f. In the essay "Exist.entialism~ 1' t'!here this 
statement was .first boldly asserted, Sartre says, 
1. Ibid., p. l~~ii. 
2. Ibid. 
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There 13 at least one being in whom existence pre-
cedes essence, a being who exists before he can be 
defined by any concept, and that this being is man. 
• • • What. is meant here· by saying that. existcce 
precedes. essence? It means that, first of all, man 
exists, turns. up, appears on the scene, and only 
ai'terwards, def'ines hi:laelf. I£ man, as the exis-
tentialist conceives him, _is indefinable, i't ia b-
cause at" tirst he is nothing. Only afterward \fill 
he be something, and he himsel.£ wiU haTe Jl:&de_ vha~ 
he will be. • • • Not only is man what he eoneei:ve~, -
himself to be, but he is al.so only what he wills · · ·· 
himself' to: ba D.i'ter this thrust toward existence. 
Man is nothing el" but what- he makea o£ ~lf' •. 
• • • vle mean that man first exists, that is, that 
man first of al~ is the being who hurls himsell 
toward a .future and l-IDo is conscious of imagining 
· himself' as being in the future. Man is at the start 
a plan which is aware o! itself.~ 
A linguistic confusion presents itself when Sartre says 
that man "is also only \ihat he wllls himself' to be after 
this tr.rust toward existence." The phrase, "after this 
thrust towa.rd existence," seoo::s to imply literally that 
previously to ~;.is thrust man bad no existence. Yet also 
included in the above quotation is Sartre's statement that 
"£irst or all man exists." 
The conf'..1sion here, w.t th the word existence as 
well as with the -word essence, is due to the fact that 
Sartre is using these two terms in a traditional sense, 
yet, within the same paragraph, and sometimes within the 
same line, he is rede.fining them for his own purposes 
1. Sartra, !'Existentialism,'" pp. 15-16. 
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"'lithout adequate clarification .for the reader.l He uses, 
for exa1nple, th a i'fvrds "axista" and "exist~ce" almost side 
by sicl.e; now glven the context above, these two ~fords .func-
tion di.ff"ere..-·1tl7 ror Sartre. And Sartre !:Uikes it more con-
.tusi.ng by not c~ri.fying whether . the t«>rd "nothing" belongs 
to and defines "exists" or "existence," I'f it defines 
"exists" tha"l this is a str~-,ge use of the .,rd "nothing" 
or vice-versa. And further, does Sartre want us.to under-
stand tts \-rord "essenc::e11 as belonging to and defining 
"exista"lce?" If so, than Sartre's use o·f the word essence 
is quite di.fferent from the traditional co~cept and various 
contemporary uses of it. 
Sartre wants i·t u."lderstood that essence does not 
precede exist~~ce. This means, ~or Sartre, that there is 
no essence, idea, image, of a thing be.fora it. comes into 
existence. Similarl7~ in Sartre's atheistic philosophy• 
there is no God who creates and hence no mind to contain 
the concept or image of rr.an before he turns up in the ~rl.d. 
1. \'lilliam Earle has accurately pointed out that :tin the 
present philosophical scene, 'existence' is no longer 
the name for that mode o:f being which everything 
shares simply insofar as it is, its traditional mean-
ing, but rat;har the name :for the being o£ human beings. 
It is~ therefore, a hermetic synonyt:l for what. is else-
~fi1ere called 'life'•" (Willi~~ Earle, "The Concept o£ 
Existence," The Journal or Philosophy, 57 (1960) 
73lr-35., 
38 
( 
39 
Man just . .finds himself' in-the-world and is confronted with 
the world; in different te..-···m:i.nology, consciousneas simply 
appea:r:-s en the scene and 1 s confronted with the transcendent 
world. ro simply appear on the scene is what Sartre means 
by the word ''e.xiststt in the statement "man .first o£ all. 
exists." 
On the other hand~ to U...."lderstand 'What Sartre 
means b7 the "~st toward existence," it is necessary 
to.und.ersta."ld *1at he mea."ls by essence. Sartre doea not 
simply thin'l.c of ess~nce as &..'1 idea or irilage which does not 
precede exis t~nc e., Re alsc t1a1 ts to emphasize that. exist-
ence is prior to essence. Ha wa::1ts to limit th·a word essence 
to mean what conscicus~ess b~co~e3 after its initial appear-
ance in ti'le ~iorld. :vnen rr.a.o"1. turns up in the \-rorld all 1.o1e 
can say of him is that he is, not l·ihat he is. Existence 
or conscious::1ess si..-nply is j for it to bec0t:1e something. ~or 
it to beeone essential~ is subsequent. 
Sartre interprets essenca as a batng-in-itself. 
The identi.fication of essence and being-in-itsel.f is crucial 
for understanding all cf Sartre's philosophy as well as 
simply t.h.e stat~nt "existence precedes essence." Thus 
Sartre's departure fro~ a traditional concept of assgnce 
hinges upon his definition or ess~~ce as a bcing•in-itsel! 
and, further 1 a b~:b.ng-in-i t sel.f •,·1hic h does not precede 
existence. Sartre's statement concerning man's "thrust 
( 
toward exi:3tence" may be interpreted as consciousness 
thrusting itself tot'fard existence in-itsel£ or being-in-
itsel.f; in shurt, toward its essence. 
Thar& otill e~sts a confusion concerning Sartre's 
use o! the \i'Ord existence. Above :tt has baa1 shown that. 
S3.rtre uses ti:a ~rord ~.x:istenae in connection id th both 
consciousnes3 and beir:s-in-itsalf or essence. Sartre does 
this intalticna1ly. Since a:r.istence is identi.fied with 
being and vi ca-vai ... sa, and si nee exist e.11ce has been identi-
.fied tr.'ith consci0usnes:'1 (as well as being-in-itself), it 
can b3 concluded that th era mn<Jt be some sort of identifi-
cation o.f consciousness and being. To this we shall turn 
in Cha.pt er V. 
Freedon ~c~not be identi£ied ~th being-in-itself. 
Being-:tn-itsel:r has been interpreted as block identity; it 
i3 neither passive !lor active. To identify .freedom with 
being-$n-itsel.f muld be beyond comprehension .. · Thus we are 
forced back to an examination o:f consciousness; it is here 
that the mam ing of freedom will be .found. 
L.O 
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CHAPTlm V 
FREEDOM AND BEING FOR-ITSELF 
1. Man and Existence 
Sartre not only assigns a being to the transcendent 
object, but he assigns a being to consciousness. The dis-
cussion in the preceding chapter indicated that Sartre would 
probably assign a being to consciousness; but f'rom the 
a.r.talysis of Sartre's existential theory or consciousness in 
Chapter III it is question:1ble whether Sartre has left any-
thing in consciousness that would allow baing to be assigned 
to it. Sartre has emptied consciousness of al.Li~s content. 
To speak metaphorically, a catharsis or consciousness has 
taken place; as Sartre puts it, 
The concept ion of the ego which we propose seem3 to us 
to ef'fect the liberation of the Tr&""lSCendental. Field• 
and at the same time its purification.l 
The Transcendental Fialdt puri£ied of' all ego-logical. 
struetur e, recovers its primary transparency. In a 
sense, it is a nothing~ sL~ce all physical, psycho-
physical, and psychic objacts, all tr..Iths, all values 
are outside it; sL'"lca o.y ma has it sal.! ceased to be 
any part or it .2 
Sartre has, by emptying consciousness or its content, made 
·co~sciousness "transpara~t," he has ~ada it a "nothing." 
1. Sartre, ~ Transcendence £!: ~ Zgo, p. 93. 
2. Ibid., 
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And it is precisely this transparency, this nothing. that 
characterizes the being of consciousness. 
Sartre says that "consciousness is consciousness 
through ,!Y!1 through. nl To say that consciousness is empty 
o£ content, that it contains no transcendental unifier, 
does not mean that consciousness is anything less than 
consciousness. Nor does it mean that Sartre is le£t with 
a semi-consciousness or a passive consciousness. Conscious-. 
ness has being and consciousness has existence; it is "con-
sciousness through and through." Sartre also hopes that 
by saying "consciousness is consciousness through and 
through" we will not think of consciousness as a genesis," 
or a "becoming.n "That would force us to suppose t'hat con-
sciousness is prior to its own existence. n2 Consciousness 
does r~t precede its existence; rather, it "is derived from 
being." It is "derived from being" in the sense that "the 
existence of consciousness comes from consciousness itself.") 
Consciousness is existence; consciousness is being; con-
sciousness is itsel£. 
Consciousness is not only itself, but it is for-
itself. Sartre calls consciousness being-.for-itsel.f ( etre-
pour-soi).. Sartre wants us to understmd clearly that a 
1 o S<Z'tre, Being and Noth in271ess, p. lvii. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid .. 
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being which is 1:2£-itsel.f is not a being which is !.!1.-itsel£. 
Ba:lng-in-itsel£ is .full· being; being-f'or-itselt is empty 
being. Sartre is not satisi"ied with simply de£ining con-
sciousness aa not a baing W!ich is or be:lng-.ror-itsel.t as 
not being-in-itsel.r. Since consciousness is both total 
emptiness aXld pure existence (be$Dg) Sartre pre£era to de• . 
fine consciousness as a being which is not. Some consider-
-
ation of what Sartre meals by "notness" and empty being ia · 
given below. 
i. }i!an ani Non-being 
A being l>ilich is ~ is non-being. Uon-being is 
empty of being. Sartre wants it understood, and in con-
trast to Hegel, that non-being is the contradiction o£ 
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beingJ not its opposite.1 To interpret non-being as the 
contradiction o:f being logically implies, says Sartre, that 
non-being "is subsecp.ent to being since it is being, first 
posited, then denied. " 2 This onee again shows the ontological 
priority of being-in-itself over being-for-itself'. 
It is through consciolJ.41Sness that negation or non-
being is introduced into the world. Man is a questioning 
being, and it is through this questioning that he introduces 
non-being into the \>.t>rld. The very struct.ura o£ questioning 
1. Ibid.~ p.~l4. 
2. Ibid. 
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itsel.r, says Sartre, does not vary. nor does the being o.r 
the non-being introduced. What varies, however, in a ques-
tioning s1 tua tion is our attitude toward what is being 
questioned. ADd since our attitude or form o£ questioning 
may vary, so likewise will the way non-being will appear in 
the liOrld. Our attitude in questioning may take the form Qf', 
what Sartre calls, Destruction. Negative judgment, or Inter-
rogation.1 The torm or way which non-being appears under 
these three questioning attitudes will vary. But funda-
mentally the being of these three f"orms o£ non-being remains 
the sane. The unvar-fing st.ructure of these dif"f"erent ques-
tioning attitudes may be identified as follows: 
In every question we stand before a being which 
we are questioning. Ever] question presupposes a 
being who questions and a being which is questioned. 
• • • This bei~g which we question, we question about 
something. I que~ion being a'tx>tl& its ways or being 
or about its being. • •• I expect £rom this beL~ a 
revelation of its being or of its W~J o~ being.2 
What I expect ia a positive or nagativa rep1y, a "Yes"·-~·or 
a "no.". And the reason I can expect either one of these 
replieS~ is because I have already posited ther:t as possibili-
ties (by the very attitude o£ questioning). "The \iOrld does 
not disclose its non-beings to one \"lho has not first posited 
1. For a further discussion o£ these three attitudes o£ 
questioning sea Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 3-12. 
2. Ibid., PP• 4-5. 
44 
' 
·i·". 
them as possibil1ties."1 Non-being-does not exis~ by itself' 
in the mrld. It is "supported in existence" by the opera-
tion of questioning; that is, by first positing the expecta-
tion o£ an appearance ot non-being as a possibility. "It 
is beeause- a physic13t expects a certain verification of 
his hypothesis that nature can tell him no.n2 
A look at ::Dme ot the di££arent forms ot non-being 
introduced by consciousness into the ll«)rld will. ahow that 
non-being is not reduced to pure subj eeti vity. When man 
makes an "interrogative'' judgment or statement at least 
three .forms of non-being are implied. The very !'act of 3. 
question implies a certain ignorance on the part of' the 
questioner. This rtignora.."lce" on :the part of the questioner·· 
is, for Sartre, a form of non-being. ThG question mi~'lt be: 
Is Peter in the cate? I£ Peter is ~ in the cafe, then 
another form of non-being is implied. I£ Peter is in the 
cafe, still another form of non-being appears. Peter is 
known and the cafe is known by all that they are AQA. Sartre 
says that the relation between the first t-wo .forms o£ non-
being "is a bridge set up between two non--beings: the non-
being o.f knowing in man 1 " i.e .. , the "ignorance" on the part 
of man, and "the possibility o.f non-being o£ being in 
1. Ibid.~ p. ?. 
2. Ibid. 
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transcendent bal.ng,." i.e.,. 1.n the expected object £or con-
-
sciousness.1 The third .form o£ non-being mentioned above 
Sartre calls "the non-baing o:f limitation.n 
!fhe question implies the existence of a truth. 
'By the. very question the questioner affirms that he 
expects an objective reply, such that we can say of 
it, "It is thus and not otherwi~e." ••• ~~at being 
~~ ~~· ~~a~~:2necessity arise on the basis o£ 
..;.;,;,;;~---
The above considerations are not an attempt to 
at'lalyze in detail Sartre' s exhaustive examination o£ the 
processes or attitudes out of which non-being arises or 
the various and sundry forms under wjrl.ch non-being appears. 
The important point is to establis}l the fact that man is 
the origin of non-being. To say th.a't man originates non-
being in the ...,.orld means that consciousness has a negating 
capacity or activity. This negating capacity "generates" 
non-being or r:;.akes non-being happen to things. !>Ian 11gen-
erates" or makes non-being "happen to things" in the sense 
that man first posits the possibility or non-being appear-
ing in the transcendent object. 
ii. Nan and Nothingness 
Sartre's inspection of th~ baing or non-being, or 
46 
the being of negation, shows us that non-being is .fundamentally 
1. Ibid., P• 5. 
2. Ibid. 
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a Nothingness. 'l'he bein& of non-being is .;.;;.;;;..-.,;;;;;;;;;;;;;~--­
would ba accurate to say that. non-being derives its founda-
tion from nathingaaas. 
The neceS8ary condition for our saying~ is that 
non-being be a perpetual presence in us and out side 
or usJ that nothingness haunts being.l · 
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To say that nothingness haunts baing means that nothingness 
derives its ef!'icacy from being. And :for this reason Sartre 
says that nothingness "exists only on the surf'ace of being." 
Nothingness has, what Sartre calls1 a sort o£ "borrowed 
existence, tt or even, a borrowed being, since it deri.ves its 
being .from being. 
Nothingne sa cannot be cone ei ved out side o£ being, 
yet it cannot be explained in terms of being. Since nothing-
ness is precisely the being of non-being, Sartre Wil.l not 
grant to noth~"less the property of negating or "nihila-
ting" itself'. Therefore, 
there must exist a Being (this can not be the In-
itself) o.f mich the property is tO nihilate 
Nothingness. to support it in its being, to sus-
tain it perpetually in its very existence, a being 
.Ql. uhieh nothingness comes ~ thing,s.2 
When Sartre SB!/S there must. exist a Being to support nothing-
ness in its being he is looking for an ontolor,ical founda-
tion for tha being of non-being. In other words, he is not 
looki~g for aneth'S r negating activity, for this activity 
1. Ibid. 1 P• 11. 2. Ibid., P• 22. 
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would again require a foa~ation. For Sartre~ only like 
generates or supports like: being generates being and non-
being or nothingness generates negation. Therefore, the 
ontological foundation and support of a generating non-being 
must be non-being. As Sartre puts it: tf!h.!! being !2.!_ l'hich 
Nothingness comes !2, ~ vJ:>rld must ~ !ll mm, Nothingness. "1 
This being is man. 
To scv that oan ,ll!!.Q.1!. means that he is pure 
existence existing for-hinsel£; in shortJ he is a beL~g­
for-itse1t~ It must be clearly kept in ~ind that the 
"notness" o:f man has a being of its o~m. The nothingness 
of man is his ontological folli'ld ation. In short, .!!!.!Yl .!.§. 
nothingness. This statement is the most crucial conClusion 
in all of Sartre's philosophy. 
2. !•ian and His Structural Activity 
It is new time to discuss in rome detail Sartre' s 
statement in wsxi st en tiali sm, " that "man make s himself". " 
An und.erstanding of th.is stata:1ent is crucial .for an under-
standing of the total structure and acti~li ty of consciousness 
and is crucial in its application to Sartre's concept o:f 
freedom. It was indicated much earlier that consciousness 
was vo'id of content. This can nm., be understood in terms 
of the nothingness of consciousness. Void of content means 
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empty of being. Man. than,. must make himself' !12.• He must 
make himael£ Jl!!. in the sense ot being-in-itsel£. Man al-
ready has a being, but this is the being of not#hingn&ss. 
This is his existence. not his essenc-e. His essence must; 
be made to 2.!.• Y1M1 1 s existence is prior to his essece. 
It has bem shown that being-in-itself' has, a certab 
ontological priority over being-for-itsel£ 1 and that this 
does not mean t.hat bed.ng-in-itseli" either ef'.feces or ai".fects 
being-£or-1tsel£. It does not effect being-for-itself simply 
because like·can only effect like; being. can only generate 
baing. !~ cannot affect being-.for-itael£ s~p~y because it 
is passive1 block identity. It does not have the property 
of activity. Being-for-itsel..f~ on tha: other hand,· does have 
the property or activity. One of these activities occupied 
our attention at the outset o£ this chapter, namely, the 
generation of non-being. Thus it can be concluded pre-
maturely that only and alone can man make himself' be. 
i. Man e.nd Desire 
It has been pointed out that co!lSciousne ss is empty 
o.f being.. This emptiness of being Sartre tenns lack. 
This lack does not belong to the nature of the in• 
itself, mich is all positivity. It appears in the 
t-rorld only 'IJith the upsurge of human reality .1 
Not only is uthe existence of de sir a as a human :fact • • • 
sufficient to prove that human reality is a lack,"2 but 
1. Ibid., p •. S6. 2. Ibid., p. S7. 
49 
~------··-_----=--------, ....
( 
( 
the notion of desire in Sartre's philosophy is explained in 
terms o.f this lack. The for-itsel.r·lacks being; it lacks 
its sel£. It lacks itself as in-itself. "Everything which 
is· lacking," says Sartre, "~s lacking £2,--1:2.!:--· nl Similarly, 
everything which is desiring is desiring .B!,. something, !2£. . 
something. This something Sartre calls a "possible"·.'Or 
possibility. 
The possible is the something which the For-itsel£ 
lacks in order to be itsel.f. The Possible is not, 
the possible is possibilized to the ~xact degree 
that the For-itself makes itself be.z 
Two important conclusions should be drawn from the 
above quotation. First, the for-itself necessarily lacks or 
desires to be in-itself. In short~ being-for-itself neees-
sarily lacks and desires being-in-itself. Being-for-itself 
is defined precisely as not being-in-itself, thus if it were 
ever to obtain or fulfill its lack, or its desire, it would 
lose its most characteristic feature: It would no longer be 
f'or-itsel.f, but in-itself. Second, Sartre wants it under-
stood that the possible exists as a real lack o~ being which 
is beyond being. It belongs to reality as a quality put into 
the he art of being as soon as consciousness emerges, or as 
Sartre said above, "the possible is possibilized to the exact 
degree that the For-itself makes itsel~ be." Putting this in 
practical te~s, Sartre says: 
The non-reflective consciousness (of) thirst is appre-
hended !2.z means of the glass of water as desirable, 
\d thout putting the Self in the centripetal position 
as the end of the desire.) 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., P• 102. 3. Ibid. 
-------------~~----'-'----'--"~~-· . -- ·- - - -·· 
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Things beeome possible because my consciousness has already 
posited them as possibilities. 
ii. Man, Bad Faith and Sincerity 
51 
Man is not on1y the origin of negation, but he is 
the origin of particular attitudes o£ negation) one o£ which 
is different from those discussed above. The tor•itsel.£ 
is not only able to introduce negations into 1h!_ world, but 
it is able to direct its negation toward itself. One atti~ 
tude of negation which direets itself inward is wha. t Sartre 
calls .f-iauvaise Foi (Bad Faith) .1 
Bad faith is an attempt "at establishing that I ac 
not what I am.n2 To illustrate, Sartre gtves an example) 
o:f a women who has consented to data a man whom she knows 
very well has other intentions than just datizig her. She 
knows that she \fill soon have to make a decision regarding 
these other intentions. She prolongs the urgency o:t the de-
cision by concerning "hersel£ onl.y with what is respectful 
and discreet in the attitude o£ her companion. She does not 
apprehend this conduct as an attempt to achieve" the other 
intentions. She apprehends objectively only what his canciuct 
1. rllalter Kau.fmann tra•-tslates mauvaise foi as "self-
deception. H He gives the reason for this translation 
a....l.d com}nres it "Vlith rtbad faith" in ~'/alter Kaufmann {ed.), 
,S?c-1 stentialism from Dostoevs. to Sartre, introduction 
and prefaces by tne editor flew1ork: Meridian Books, 
1957}, p. 222. 
2. This paragraph is a paraphrase of Sartre' s example. 
Direct quotations are indicated, See Sartre, BeiEPi !!!!.!! 
Nothingness, p. 55. 
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signifies on the sur:f"aee. "The man· who is speaking to her 
appears to her as sincere and respectful as the table is 
round or square, as the wall coloring is blue or gray." 
She knows very well his real intentions but is still. pro-
longing as long as possible her mo~ent o£ decision. 
Sartre• s concept o£ bad faith may be elari.tied by 
an understanding of mat he means b7 "sincerity, r. which is 
the "antithesis of bad faith." To be sine ere means to be 
what one is. In this case bad faith is impossible, for one 
~becomes instead his being." H~;~ever, as was indicated 
above, to be what one .!§. is to be a being-in-itsel£ .and· a 
being-in-itself is not i'ha t one is ontologically. Sartra 
illustrates his point by the example of a waiter in a ca.f'e: 
His movanent is quick and .fo~..;ard, a little too 
precise1 a little too rapid. Ha comes toward the 
patrons 'd th a step a little too quick. • • • All 
his ba1avior seana to us a game •••• He is play-
ing at b~~n~ a waiter in a cafe •••• The waiter 
in the cite c~ not be im'fl.ediately a. caf(;l waiter 
in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell.l 
-
If I rspresa~ myself as hi:.1, I a.:a not he; I a:n 
separated from him as tha object f'rom the. .subject, 
separated 12z. nothiali' but this nothing isolates me 
from l'l.im. • • • I feet him. with. no'thingness. In 
vain do I fulfill the functions of a cafe waiter • 
• • • Yet t.:.'lere is no doubt that I am in a sense a· 
cafe waiter--otherwise could I not just as well call 
myselr a diploma~ or a reporter? But 1£ I am one, 
this can not be in the mode of bai.ng-in-itsel£. I 
a.'n a uait er in the mode of being \'lhat !. a ~.2 
1., Sartra~ Being and Nothingness~ p. 59. 
2. ~OJ P• 60. 
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The aim of sincerity and bad f'aith saem to ba simil:lr in 
their outcome; both are "a continual gam-a of mirror and re-
.flection"" Sincerity is the ttpassage from the being 'Which 
is \'."hat it is~ to the being \Gich is not what it is and in• 
versely from t.he being which is not \'lhat it is to the being 
which is what it is.nl Similarly~ bad .faith causes "me to. 
be what I am, 1n the mode of !not baing \'lha't one is,' or 
not to b3 what I am in the mode of 'being what one is.'"2 
Since sincerity is unable to accomplish its project it be-
comes the condition for the possibility o£ bad faith. 
Ontologieally speaking, one never becomes sincere. 
To be sil'lcere ontologically means to be what one is, that 
is, to be a being-in-itself~ a..'1.d man is defined precisal.y 
as not a beingAt~-itself' (not being his essence). This 
being the cas9, why does Sartre even speak o£ man becoming 
. 
sincere when sincerity is impossible for man? Sartre him-
selr points out that the .:1ennin.; of sincerity "is in con-
tradiction -vtith the structure of ••• conseiou~ess~".3 
He· fu...-r-ther points out that the rtorigi.nal structure o£ 'not 
. being what one is' renders impossible in advance all move-
ment toward being in itself or 'being what one is' _.n4 In 
1. Ibid.~ P• 66. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., Po 62. 4.. Ibid. 
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what. sense~ then, does, or can, man become sincere? Althougb · 
Sartrets t;erminology becomes somewhat ambigious at this 
point it is helpful to point ou~ that a very subtle dis-
tinction exists between Sartre's statement that sincerity 
is the "passage .from the being lilich is what it is, to the 
being which is not what it is" and the statement that sin• 
eerity is the passage from "the being M11ch is not what it 
is to the being which is what it is." 
First, it must again be remembered that one's mode 
of existing (being-for-itself) never passes ontologically 
to another mode of existing ( be1ng-in-itsel!). 'l'he kind 
of "passage" which is involved in sincerity seems to be a 
"psychological" passage; that is, man reflectively consti-
tutes himself as a being which is what it is. It is sug-
gested that this "psychological" mode o£ existing is what 
Sartre means by the word "sense" in the. statement quoted 
above-"Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sensa a cafe 
waiter--otherwise could I not just as well call myself' a 
diplomat or a reporter?" The only conclusion possible is 
that sincerity belongs to this "kind" of being precisely 
because Sartre has previously indicated that one can not ~ 
a cafe waiter in the sense that an inkwell is an inkwell. 
The reason, then, that sincerity becomes the condition for 
bad £aith is that by assuming the functional being of the 
waiter one r..as denied the being \thich one is, namely, a 
( 
i 
being which is ~· Sincerity is not the passage, 
ontologically, !rom a being lilich is Jl.2ll to a being which 
is (in the sense of essence), but- the passage from a being 
which is not to a "kind" of bel:ng which, it is sugges'tecl, 
is the denial of the :fact that. one is a being which is n~ 
. -
and the fact tbat one can never become a being-in•itself'. 
Sartre clearly points out that the consciousness of the 
impos sibility-ot-becoming-a-being-in-itself is the "VerT 
stuff of consciousness." Thus when one denies the con-
sciousness or .fact of this impossibility one has assumed 
a ".kind 11 o£ being which Sartre calls sincerity. And it must 
be kept clearly in mind that a denial of the impossibility-
o£-becoming-a-being-in-itselt does not ontologically con-
stitute one as a being-in-itself. Sincerity involves, what 
we have pre.ferred to call, a "psychologicaln passage .f'rom a 
being which is what it is (in this case, non-being), to a 
being which is not what it. is (in this case, a denial ot 
non-being). At this point Sartre's discU8sion of sincerity 
becomes almost unintelligible. Ha does not clearly and pre-
cisely indicate what he means by a denial of non-being; in 
other words, what it is that is real.ly involved in a denial 
of: non-being and, f'urther, how this denial (sincerity) funda-
ment ally differs from baing-in-itsel.f. In short, ~en Sartre 
says that one is i!! i! sense a cafe waiter and than identifies 
this "in a sense" with sine erity he has neither clearly nor 
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adequately indicated what he means by "in a sense." One 
thing is certain• however, slncerity .is never possible as 
long as it is cone aived as a passage f'rom being which is 
not (exis~anca) to being llhich is what it ia (essence). It, 
on the contrary, this is .mat. Sartre means by sincerity, 
' 
then not only is sincerity impossible• but it is impossible 
. . 
by his own definition and thus he has contradi.cted him&elf' 
when he says that man may become. since.re.-
It might be objected that man is necessarily in bad 
faith since he can never become a being-in-itsel.£'. However, 
bad faith must be interpreted along a similar line as sin-
cerity. When Sartre says that bad faith is an attempt "at 
. establishing that I am not what I am," he means that one is 
in bad faith when ona denies that one is a being which is 
n2,3i or \ilen one denies the fact of the impossibi.lity-o:t-
becoming-being-in-itsel£. When Sartre says that bad faith 
is the attempt "at establishing that I am not what I am." 
he does not mean that one is trying to establish themselves 
as a being-in-itself'. Bad faith is a lie to onesel£; it is 
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a .lie about one's .f"undamenta.l and ontol.ogical condition. Bad 
faith is simply the denial or the fagt that one is a being 
l'mic h is not, and included wi. thin this lie.: is the denial o£ 
the fact that one is a being 'Ythich neces$ar!l7 lacks or 
desires being-in-itself. 
. -- - ·-- -- . -· - --- -----~--------------- ----
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In conclusion it cal be said that when one denies to 
himsel.f the :fact that he is a being which is !1.2Jl (enstence• 
being-.for•itsel:f} than one is in bad f'aith. In assn•1ng 
bad faith one has assumed a "kind" o£ be:l.ng 'Nlicb is some-
thing othe&"' than a belng'which is for-itself' and something 
other than a being which is in-itself. Sartre calls this 
being or bad faith sincerity. Due to the unintelligibility 
of Sartre's definition of' this being of bad taith (sincerity) 
the author of' this thesis has ventured only to speak o£ this 
being as a "kind" of being, as something other than the 
purely ontological mode o£ being £2£.-itself and being !a-
itself. 
3. Summary 
In conclusion it can be said that being-for-itself 
is nothingness. This nothingness is lack. It is the lack 
of being a"ld the desire of being. And although belng•:for-
itsel:f necessarily desires being-in-itself it can never be 
completely identified with being-in-itsel£, for "its being 
is always at a distancett and the for-itself is not. The 
. --
£or-itself's "first relation with being-in-itsel£ is nega• 
tion."1 Further, its presence to being is characterized 
by a flight from being. 
The for-itself's being is on both sides of it. 
1. Ibid., p. 123. 
- --- ---·-- •· .. -
-----
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Behind. it ~ its past; and before, it will be its 
.future. It is a flight outside of co-present being 
and from the being which it will be. At present it 
is not what it is (past) and it is what it is no~ 
(future).~ 
The for-itself is a lack and its future is what it has 
.-.;;;;;;;;;;,.:;.--
"~ .2!, insofar as Lf.iJ can not be it." The £or-1tsel.t ia 
always a flight out of the past and into the future. It ia 
a fligJlt from its being and toward its being. Yet it will 
never !?.!, what it lacks, for, again, its being lies outside, 
at a -distance, and beyond; it is defined as not being that 
being. We will now turn in Chapter VI to the way .freedom 
is defined in terms or consciousness, in terms o£ both its 
existence and activity. 
1. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEFIUITION .M4D CaiTICAL EVALUATION 
1. Definition 
This section will concern itself with tying to-
gether the results of our previous considerations into 
an intelligible definition of Sartre's concept or free-
dom. It is felt by the author of this thesis that a . 
definition of the concept of freedom results in two main 
areas of gmeralization, namely, freedom as ontology and 
freedom as activity. Each r.dll be dealt with respectively 
below. Cri tie ism and evaluation of Sartre' s concept of 
freedom will be taken up in Section Two. 
i. Freedom a..""l.d Ontologz 
Freedom· is on the side of consciousness and con-
sciousness is on the side o£ :freedom. To establish the 
p.~per meaning of the being of consciousness there mtist 
be included in this n~aning the notion of freedom. And to 
establish the proper meaning of freedom implies a defini-
tion of the being of consciousness. In short, the ontol-
ogical status of freedom implies being-for-itself; freedom 
may be identi.fied with the beinea of consciousness. The 
b~i~ of co~sciousness appears to us as rreedom. 
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In the previous chapter i'ie saw that man must be 
nothing in his being "in order that through him nothing-
ness may come to bef. ng." 'ro "be nothing" tleans £or 
Sartre to "be £reedom" or to be free. To be out side o£ 
- -
being also means to E.! tree. And, Sartre says, 
it is in an~ish that man gets the consciousness 
o£ his .freedom, or if' you prefer, anguish is the 
mode o£ being of .freedom as consciousness of be-
ing; it ·is in an@.lish that freedom is, in ita 
being, in question for it self .1 
This statement of Sartre's can be restated in tl.'IO ways. 
First, that it is throur.h the feeling of a."loouish that 
.freedom manifests itself and, second, it is !a anguish 
that one discovers his being, that is, his freedom. It 
is :for this reason that t-larjorie Grene speaks of "dread-
ful freedoQ.n2 Being or freedom is so dreadful in its 
appearance, i.e., an appearance of emptiness or nothing-
ness, that one is anguished by this appearance or mani-
.festation. 
In Chapter IV we spoke of Sartre's well. known 
dictum: e.:dstence precedes essence. We re:terred part o.f 
the di.fficulty of clarification of this statement to 
linguistic confusion. In Being ~~ Nothingness Sartre 
1. Sartre, Bein~ Jilli! Nothingness, p. 29 .. 
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2. Narjorie Grene, Introduction .!!.2, Existentialism (Chicago: 
The University o£ Chicago Press, 1959). First published 
as Dre~dful Freedom. 
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replaces the word existence with the word freedom. Since 
this thesis is co.~cerned with the concept of freedom the 
substitution of the ~rd .freedQZD for exiatence ought to 
give linguistic clarity rather than linguistic con.f'usi.on. 
The relation of existence to essence is no~ 
comparable to what it is for the things of the 
world. Human freedom precedes essence in man 
and makes it possible; the essence o£ the human 
being is suspended in his freedom. • • • la1a.n 
does not exist fl,.rst in order to tie f'ree 
sub seguentlz .1 
Freedom has the same ontological status as existence or 
the being of consciousneas because it is identical with 
tr.a se two. Hhe>.n Sartre says that ttman does not exist 
f'irst in order to be free subsequently" he is conc1uding 
two things. First.J that existence or being takes no 
ontological priority over freedom because freedom is 
precisely the same thing as e.."d.sten.ce and being. Second, 
tr.at because freedom belongs to being and existence it 
doas not refer to essence. Freedom does no't define 
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essences. ttTo be free subsequently" suggests that one 
first exists ar..d then becomes free.- And this would imply 
that one would become something. i.e., his essence, a 
being-in-itself. And freedom belongs on the side of being-
for-itself and not on the side of being-L~-itse1£. 
1. S~re, Being ~ ~lothing;nesst p. 25. 
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One might inquire of' Sartre why he has not through-
out Being 1!!!S tlothingp.ess employed the •fiOrd freedom. to 
describe the "naturert or being o£ consciousness. The 
reason is that the word freedom does not, in 'normal usage. 
usually refer to being; nor does it re£er to being in the 
sans e Sartre has defined being. In short, the -word .free-
dom does not usually re.fer to the nothinmess o£ being. 
It might be conjectured that Sartre himself once experi-
enced, what he calls, an existential awareness or ree~ 
of' "aloneness" or "emptiness." In order for him to talk 
about and communicate this n.reeling" to others he had to 
choose, what T. s. Eliot calls, an "objective correla-
tive."1 An objective correlative is a 110rd or words which 
best correlate or approximate an emotional experience; it 
is a word1 etc., which in its re£erring orders a sL~ilar 
experience. o~~tional or ideational. to the one which is 
trying to be communicated or reduplicated. I.f Sartre .first 
had triads as he does in his literary w:>rk, to use the word 
.freedom to describe the "emptiness" and "nothingness" of" 
being which he £elt, he would have :failed to make the 
appropriate communication to his readers. In .fact, right 
a.fte"t" ~artre in_troduced the notion o£ freedom in Being .2m! 
Nothingness he says, ttBut freedom is only a na'1la. • •• 
1. See T. 3. Eliot, "Hamlet, tf Selected Essayl]. (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and Comp~~y, 1950), PP• 124-125. 
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~'fe ought to ask now~ what is human -rreedom~ ~1 As was 
suggested above, tha word freedom is not normal~y, in 
most people's expez-ience, a."'l objective correlate o£ or 
for a :.f."ee~ing of em?tiness. It is probably for this 
reason that Sartre found it necessary to write Bein& !mS. 
Nothingness. Throughout Beipg and Uothi.ngness Sartre seas 
to be searching for the objective correlatives or the 
various aspects a.'"ld levels of what is basically an atti-
tude of feeling. 2 .\nd it is tor this reason, and not be-
cause he is a Frenchmail~ that Being~ Nothingness is .such 
a voluminous ~·ork. In short, BeL'1.g ~ Nothingness is an 
uncensing search for an objective correlati~e or an experi-
ence which can only be falt. Only after an exhaustive 
examination of Being ~ Nothingness can one conclude that 
the word freedom best describes the being of consciousness. 
And the only reason it becomes the best word is 3i:nply be-
causa Sartre bas consciously idaTltified it, in this work, 
with tha "nature" or being or consciousness. In short, it 
becomes purely a matter or definition. 
We can conclude this section on Freedom and Ontology 
by suggesting that it could hav9 been ti.tledt Ontological. 
1. Sartre, Being .§!!!! Nothingness~ pp. 24-25. 
2. One's being or one's existence or one's freedom is 
first felt, then reflected upon. See Chapter III, 
Section 2, for the distinction between reflective and 
pre-reflective consciousness. 
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Fx·eedom. This claim is possible if we think of the '.\llrd 
ontolo[ical not as referring to the notion o£ Being in 
general, but specifically to the being o£ consciousness 
(and as Sartre has de.fined it}. \'fe have already identi-
fied this being with freedom. And because o£ this 
identification it can be concluded that the first maan-
ing of Sartre's concept of freedom refers to something 
which man possesses., something which man has, or something 
..,.,hich man 1 s, nar.1ely 1 the nothL"lgness of being. This is 
what allows Sartre to sp e.a..< of man as trha'ring freedom~ rrl 
In short, man is freedom, and it is this freedom, the 
ontological freedom, ~mich constitutes t~e rtfra~e~rorkn or 
man.2 ''There is no dif.f"e.:-ence between the bein; of man 
a.""J.d his being-free. n3 The term ontclo;;ical f'reedcm sug-
gssts that this tt.frameworkn means being-free. And being-
free carries with it the notion that one is U!lable to 
decide l\hethar he wants to be free. 1'l:Je do not choose to 
be free. • • • vie are condemned to freedom.tt4 
1. See ~~tra, Bein& ~ Nothingness, Part IV,.. 
2. Ibid., p. 482. 
). Ibid., p. '"'C" "-.J• 
lh Ibid., P~ 4$5 .. 
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ii. Freedom !UlS!. Activity 
We do not choose to be free, but "we are a free-
dom which chooses."l If we are a freedom which chooses 
then we are a freedom tba'- does something; we are a free-
dom wl th activity. Not only 1 s Sartre t s concept of free-
dom tied to his concept of the being of consciousness, bu~ 
it 1 s similarly tied to his theory of the activity of con:. 
sciousness. Further, the conce~ of freedom as ontological 
freedom provides the condition for freedom as activity. 
For Sartre, one's lack o:f something provides the condition 
for the desire o£ this something; this is man 1 s ontological 
condition. Now for Sartre, and this is a key point, to 
desire something means to intend something, and to intend 
something means, at the same time, to act upon this inten-
tion; there is no separation between the intention and the 
act~2 It is precisely the being of consciousness ~ freedom 
that provides the condition for man's free activity or 
autonomy of choice. 
The activity which is important here is man's in-
. 
evitable, unceasing, yet interminable, striving and struggling 
to become a being-in-itsel£. It is the attempt by conscious-
ness to beco:ce £ull being or to assume block identity. But 
1. Ibid., pp. 484·485. 
2. See Ibid., p. 433, pp. 483-485. Sartre t~uld say all 
"conscious rro jects" (actions) are intentional and all 
L~tentions \desires) are "conscious projects." 
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what is meant here by free activity? The question 
might be asked of Sartre, how he can speak o£ f'ree 
activity it this activity is inerltabl.e am intermin-
able? Where <b es freedom come in? 
Showing the inevitability of this activity is· 
one of Sartrets major the•a in Beipg and Notf]ingnes!• 
. It is precisely the For-it salt's choice or the In-it salt . 
that helps. close the. separation or gap between Sartre•s 
two realms of being. It is important now to show that. 
just because it is the inevitable nature or f'reedom to 
desire or to chooae the In-itself' that the bein,g or con-
sciousness does not destroy itself as tree activity. It 
is free precisely because it is following certain deter-
minations. It is following its own determinations or 
limitations !!:! freedom, as a being which is !!,2A enougg. 
Let us look at this nora concretely. 
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Ontological freedom can neither modify nor escape 
its being-free nor its necessity to choose or desire the In-
itself (Which is implied by the very definition or being-
.free}. The only way man can escape ontological freedom and 
its inevitable desire o£ the In-itsel.f' is by suicide. In 
suicide one escapes his onto log! cal :freedom forever, but 
the possibility o£ e~cape from or abandonment of ontological 
freedom is precisely a :rr~e choice. The For-itsel£ is 
choosing to become something other than '!.--That it is. namsly, 
( 
an In-i tsel£. Freedom is choosing· not to choose any 
more. Strictly speaking,. then, man is unable to escape 
comp~etely his freedom. It is of cardinal importance to 
point out that this is the only place where man is not 
free. The importance lies in the fact that freedom is 
not being 11mited by anything outside of itsel.r. It is 
not being limited by an In-itself'. It is its own limita-· 
tion. 
This fact may be compared wi~ the fact ot the 
In-itself baing a limitation or obstacle to freedom. 
Prec:i sely speaking, the In-itself as an obstacle for 
.freedom is not a limitation of' .freedom. The signif'icance 
of this statement lies in the notion that the In-itselt 
is an obstacle ~ freedom, not an obstacle ~ freedom. 
Freedom must choose lmatever In-itself it pleases as an 
obstacle to be overcome, to be assumed, etc. 
The resistance which freedom reveals in the 
existent, :f'ar from being a danger to freedom, 
results only in enabling it to arise as freedom. 
There can be a .free .for-itself only as engaged 
~ in a rasi sting world. Outside of t.'lis engage~ 
ment the notions of freedom1 of determinism, of necessity lose ~ mea~g. 
I.f there is no obstacle t.hen there is no .freedom. The 
considerations in Chapter V should be enough to remind us 
that this does not mean freedom by itself creates its own 
1. Ibid., P• 4S3. 
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obstacles. It has been shown that ~he In-itself has a 
certain ontological priority over the For-itsel£.1 The 
For-itself simply reveals the In-itself" ~~-obstacle, 
that is, as something for it to become or something 
physical and external for it to overcome. Sartre otters 
a particularly clear example of freedom positing its own 
limitations or its own ends. 
A particular crag, which manifests a profound 
resistance if I wish to displace it, will be on 
the contrary a valuable. aid if I want to climb 
it in order to look over the countryside. In 
itself ••• it is neutral; that is, it waits to 
be illuminated by an end in order to manifest 
itself as adver3e or helpful. • • • Even if the 
crag is revealed as ~too difficult to climb," and 
if we must give up the ascent, let us note that 
the crag is revealed as such only because it \iaS 
originally grasped as ncli!!lbable"; it is therefore 
our freedom which constitutes the limits which it 
\•rill subsequently cncountero2 
If the crag is revealed as "too difficult to 
climb" one might object that this limits our freedom. In 
other words, i~-I am unable to make the climb then my free-
dom is limited; I am not free to climb the crag. In 
Chapter II it was suggested that this notion--obtaining 
what one desires--has nothing to do wL th Sartre' s inter-
pre~ation of the concept of freedom and determinism. At 
the outset o.f this section it was said that the For-itself' 
lo See ibido See also Chapter IV. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 4S2o 
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was not. onl.y an inevit.abl.e desire of the In•itself' 1 but 
that this desl.re is interminable; this meant, in short, 
that the For-itself can never become In-itselt. It is 
defined precis el.y as SODlething other than In-1 tself'; it 
is ~ enough; it ·is a nothingness. And- !!1 vain is the 
For-itself "abandoned to the intolerable ·necessity of 
making it self be. nl If, for example, the In•itself' is 
a physical belng, such as the crag, the success ot climb-
ing the crag does not constitute free activity. The tree 
activity of consciousness refers to the autonomy of choice, 
whether the choice is of my self, my environment 1 others, 
etc., and not to the ability to obtain the ends \'ilich one· 
desires or has posited as ends to be desired. Sartre 
sums up the free-project of the For-itself very well. 
Thus by its very projection toward an end, 
freedom constitutes as a being in the midst of 
the \tOrld a particular datWll which it has to be. · 
Freedom does not choose it, .for this would be to 
choose its own existence; but by the choice which 
it makes of its end, freedom causes the datum to 
be revealed in this or that way. in this or that 
light in connection with the revelation of the 
't.rorld itself' .2 
In Chapter II the terms motive and motivation 
were introduced. It was suggested that the emotions are 
often traditionally interpreted as a conditioning or 
1. Ibid., P• 483. 
2. Ibid~, P• 487 
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motivating factor in human action. Sartre. on the other 
hand, has defined emotions and consciousness in such a 
way that the emot~ona are no longer a motivating force; 
they are not something which sweep over man and determine 
his choices. Here, it is possible to be a little more 
explicit. And it will become evident why Sartre wants us 
to understand ~otives in tenas of the In-itself. 
The for-itself discovers itself as engaged in being, 
hemmed in by being, threatened by being; it dis-
covers the state of things which surrounds it as 
the cause for a reaction of defense or attack. But 
it can make this discovery only because it freely 
posits the end in relation to which the state or 
things is threatening or favorabls.l 
The ranark in Chapter II that man chooses or assumes his 
motives means, then, that man is freely choosing or 
assuming motives mich he has already posited as motives 
to be chosen. And it is "not because I am free that my 
act is not subject to the determination or motives, n 
rather, "the structure or motives as ine.f.tective is the 
condition of my freedom.n2 As soon as man is conscious 
of the "causes" or "motives" which induce his action the 
"motives" are already a tr~~scendent object for conscious-
ness. They are outside of consciousness. Th~ are objects 
or motives fEE_ consciousness. Consciousness is always be-
yond its essence. This is what it means to say that con-
sciousness precedes its essence. Consciousness or freedom 
1. Ibid., PP• 487-488. 2. Ibid., P• 34. 
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is a1ways beyond the causes and motives of ita 
action. 
There are two reasons why we have preferred 
to speak of freedom as activ:ltr in this section rather ·c .. 
than· freedom as aut onopll .2!, choice and £reedom as doirw, 
making, or actL,g. It was .felt that the word activity 
would best refer to both intention and act; intention 
suggests activity on the part of consciousness and action 
suggests activity on the part of man as a whola or in 
part. However, Sartre makes no distinction between in-
tention and act. Strictly speaking, Sartre's notion of 
the autonomy of choice re£ers to both intention and act. 
I intend to climb the crag, and though the crag may be 
too slippery, too steep, or I too weak •. to climb, I am 
still free to try to climb it. I intend or choose this 
climb a."ld learn the value of this choice by undertaking 
some action. The reason that the term activity has been 
employed in this section was, first, simply to distinguish 
it £rom ontological freedom, -...'h.ich is the essantial struc-
ture or the b(?-ing of consciousness and, second; to let it 
be known that this "framework" o£ man has a necessary 
maven ent. And this movement is characterized by the notion 
of the 'tintentionality of consciousness," which was intro-
duced in Chapter III. In this section we have spoken of 
the "intentionality o£ consciousness" as rreedom SA 
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activiti• and which Sartre prefers to speak of as the 
autono!Y .2! choice. The :freedom which is expressed, tor 
Sartre 1 by the phrase autonomx !2!, choice is the .freedoa 
popularly known as freedom o:r action (excluding the suc-
cess o£ this action) and the freedom of choice or inten-
tion (including the necessity of this action). 
iii. 
The best way to summarize the two meanings given 
to Sartre' s concept of £reedom is by reference to his 
statement that "we are a freedom which chooses. but we 
do not choose to be f'ree."1 A freedom which chooses 
suggests freedom as activity and a freedom which does 
not choose to be free suggests ontological .freedom. 
Sartre 1 s description of ontological :freedom not only 
provides the condition for free activity, but it is, 
according to Sartre, the only ontological condition which 
provides the basis upon which a technical and philoeophical 
concept of the autonomy of choice can be established. 
Ontological freedom has a certain ontological priority 
over free choice since it is the condition out of which 
a meaningful concept of free choice arises. 
It would be possible to conclude, as many of 
Sartre t s comment a tors have, that Sartre' s concept of 
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.:treedom consists .fundamentally in "having to choose.tt This 
conclusion is possible only 1£ the reader grasps f'irst the 
signi.fieance o£ the words "having to. choose." Freedom 
means "haTing" and freedom means "choosing." In this 
. thesis we have preferred to call freedom as "baring" onto-
logical freedom and freedos as ttchoosing" freedom as 
activity. It is perfectly proper and partect.ly accurate, 
if the above distinction is kept in mind. to conclude that 
Sartre's concept of .freedom consists fundamental.ly in the 
not ion of "having to choose." 
Part of the purpose of this thesis was to deter-
mine the relation betl>~een the concept of f'reedom and some 
of Sartre' s other phenomenological and ontological con-: 
cepts. To do this is simply to have ~he thesis turn back 
upon itself. For almost all o.r Sartre's phenomenological. 
and ontological concepts are only technical descriptions 
of one underlying and fundamental. notion. namely, freedom. 
The relation then between the concept of freedom and the 
other phenomenological and ontological concepts is simply 
the relation of the parts to the whole. 'l'ha concept of· 
freedom is the whole ~.nd a description of' any of its parts 
is not complete except by ref"erence to the whole; yet 'at 
the same time the whole is illuminated by a description of 
the parts. The notion o:f freedom conditions and inspires 
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the entire philosophy o£ Jean-Paul. Sartre. And it is for 
this reason that it was said at the ·outset that the mean-
ing of freedom p.elPY'ades all of Sartre' s phenomenological. 
ontology. 
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It is slightly inaccurate e.ven· to speak of' :free-
dom as a concept in Sartre•s philosophy, except where a 
conceptual analysis of his philosophy is being made.. As. 
has been indicated, only in anguish is ontological f'reedo• 
and the necessity of the possibility o£ a free choic& first 
given to man. It is for this reason, and contrary to the 
remarks above concerning the word .freedom as an objective 
correlative, that Being·~ Nothingness is not wholly 
. 
adequate for an understanding o£ freedom. It is only 
adequate for a conceptual understanding. Since .freedom 
is first felt, it is necessary for one to first feel it 
in order to grasp the full impact and signi:ficance o£ free-
dom. One of Sartre' s attempts in his literary works is to 
let h~s reader see various ways that people confron.1; this 
freedom and their possibility of choice. He puts the 
characters in a situation which helps induce the discovery 
of their being and their choice o£ being. This is also 
Sartrets attempt in Being~ Nothingness 1 but people seem 
to be so psychologically disposed as to more easily identity 
emotionally \·rl. th a character in a work of fiction, than 
( 
~ 
with the dry and technical description o£ the action o£ 
a character in a philosophical treatise. 
This thesis opened with what the author of the 
thesis thou€)1 t was a signi:f'icant paragraphJbY Sartre: 
NeYer were we .freer than under the Geman 
Occupa t1 on. We had lost al.l our rights~. and .first 
of all our· right to speak. They insulted us to our 
.races every day--and we had to hold our tongues. 
They deported us ..!!! masse--as workers, as Jews, aa 
political prisoners. Everywhere, --upon the wal.ls, 
in the press, on the screen, --we .found that filthy 
and insipid image o£ ourselves which the oppressor 
Wished to pre:lent to us. And because of all this, 
we were :free.~ 
The German Occupation, with its various .forms of oppression 
served as an In-itself. Sartre, along ".d. th :lOSt Frenchmen, 
found themselves hemmed in and threatened by the years or 
occupation. The reason that Sartre eould even discover 
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that the Gennan ideology and tortur-es were threatening, that 
they were something to be escaped and overthrown, was because 
Sartre had already .freely posited other ends lit ich in rela-
tion to German ideology were something to be desired. The 
German Occupation was not a threat in itsel£. It was a 
threat simply because Sartre had posited it as a threat. 'ro 
the degree that the Occupation kept trying to .force its be-
ing upon Sartre, the more threatening it became.. To say that 
it became more threatening means that Sartre kept choosing 
1. Sartre, "The Republic of Silence," p. 39. 
( 
it as a threatening being. Sartre became freer in his 
own decisions; he had to continually choose his ends as 
desirable and the German ideology and tortures as unde-
sirable. 
2. Crit.ical Evaluation 
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Various critic isms have been directed against. Sartre' s 
philosophy as a whola. . However, 1t is the purpose of this 
section to look specifically and concretely at certain criti-
cism directed against Sartre's doctrine of freedom. .After 
careful cc~~ideration two criticisms suggested by Wil£red 
Desan in his~ Tragig Finale have been picked for analysis. 
Desan's criticisms are relevant to our purposes for two 
reasons. Firs-c, ther.r are typical or the criticism directed 
against Sartre's doctrine of freedom; second, the conrusions 
and problems which arise as the resUlt o£ this type of criti-
cism can be clearly seen. The .first criticism once again 
involves us in a discussion of "existence precedes easance." 
The second criticism is directed against, Ylfhat Desan calls, 
Sartre's notion o£ "absolute freedom.n 
i. Freedom and Essence 
Wil£red Desan feels that Sartre's doctrine o£ 
freedom "involves an insoluble contradiction.nl De~~ 
acknowledges that, according to Sartre, 
1. ttilfrid De san, ~ Tr~a-ic Finale (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1954 , pp. 161-164. 
Harvard 
_\ 
Human reality can not be considered 2.s an essence, 
since the For-itself is :tJure. and undefinable freedom. 
But here precisely appears the antinomy. If the For-
itself is pure freedom one is in fact presented vii th 
an essence of hu..-nan reality. Sartre does not escape 
the necessity of defining that about ·,;hich he is 
talking.l 
To speak about the 'condemnation' and the 'necessity' 
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of freedom ••• is simply to return to the philosophy 
of essences from vmich Sartre has tried so energetically 
to escape. • • • If • • • a human being is free by 
nature, freedom is its essence. 
Sartre himself does not really succeed in ex-
plicitly eliminating the notion of human reality or 
of essences preceding (logically) existence.2 
Desan adds support to his argument by quoting, ~nat he 
thinks, are damaging statements by Sartre. One of these 
quotations is from Reflexions ~ la question juive. Part 
of this quotation reads: 
!v1en differ from one another as their situations differ 
and also according to the choice they make of their 
own person. What men have in common is not a nature, 
but a condition, i.e., an ensemble of restrictions 
and coercions: the necessity of dying, or '~rking in 
order to live, of existing in a vmrld together "With 
other people • .J 
De san next refers to the place in ~xist entialism''where Sartre 
says, "There does exist a universal human condition.n4 By 
condition Sartre means, nmore or less definitely, the a priori 
1. Ibid., p. 162. 
2. Ibid. 
3. As quoted in Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
4. As quoted in Ibid., p. 163. 
limits \'Thich outline man's fu.11.damental situation in the 
universe. n Briefly, these are Desan 's arguments in support 
of his contention that Sartre has made freedom the essence 
of man. Let us see exactly what Desan is getting after 
and if, in the final analysis, Sartre's notion of freedom 
can be subjected to this claim. Before Desan's criticism 
can be applied to Sartre it is necessary to understa.'1d vlhat 
Desan himself considers the word essence to mean. 
Desan's formula for essence seems to run simply 
like this. Metaphysically speaking, an essence is -vrhat makes 
a thing what it is; it describes the nature of a thing. It 
is the individualizing or distinctive characteristic; it is 
not an accidental characteristic. It might, therefore, be 
suggested that Desan thinks of essence in an Aristotelian 
sense. He gives essence an Aristotelian interpretation in 
the sense that essence is something vvhich resides in the 
existence of a thing. This is in contrast to Plato's con-
ception that essence exists apart from particular existence 
and that essence is something in which particular existence 
participates. Since, according to Desan, Sartre has defined 
the nature of human reality as freedom, this freedom becomes 
man's essence. And then he adds, this essence logically 
precedes existence. Let us now look at Desan's criticism 
and see if it may be applied consistently and internally to 
Sartre' s po si ti on. 
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On one level, given Desan 1 s definition of essence, 
it is not categoric ally wrong, or a complete misrapresenta-
tion of Sartre 1 s position, to say that freedom is the essence 
of man. Sartre, in his attempt to say something about free-
dom,·that is, by defining freedom as the fundamental struc-
ture of man, has made it the nature of man, and Desan prefers 
to call this nature of man the essence of man. On this 
level Sartre would probably have no quibble v-Ji th Desan, or 
if he did, it would simply be a quibble. 
Sartre would prefer to avoid even a quibble, and 
for this reason he has tried, except when popularizing his 
philosophy, to avoid using the word nature. For when one 
talks about the nature of something it usually evokes an 
immediate reference to its essence. Desan ought to be aware 
that only in defining freedom has Sartre made it the essence 
of man. And if this stater.1ent holds, then Desan is only 
criticizing Sartre on a verbal level. A statement quoted 
above illustrates how cautious Sartre is when talking about 
freedom or human re2lity--the human condition, says Sartre, 
is nmore or less definitely, the a priori limits which out-
line man's fundamental situation in the universe." Sartre 
prefers the term fundamental situation or ncondition" to the 
word nature. And it is precisely this move from essence or 
nature to condition or situation which gives Sartre's 
j 
philosophy its distinctive flavor.l Desan, after his 
exhaustive treatment of Being and Nothingness, should 
understand that even Sartre is aware of the problem in-
volved in defining freedom. Sartre acknowledges that by 
defining freedom he makes it become what most people think 
of as the nature of man and therefore the essence of man. 
The only thing Sartre can then do, and he does do, is to 
say that it is not the nature of man. In other words, he 
then carefully defines it as not the nature of man. To 
be sure, he defines it as the existence of man, the 
nothingness of man. And then he defines this nothingness 
of man as something which cannot be defined, precisely be-
cause it is nothingness, yet he continues to positively 
define it. Indeed, a confusion exists. 
On a definitional level Sartre has certainly made 
freedom the essence of man. But two other important con-
siderations arise at this point. First, if Desan thinks 
that in reality the freedom that Sartre is trying to point 
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1. Sartre might even be defended at this point by saying 
~hat essence or nature refers to a metaphysical some-
tping and not an ontological something and that condi-
tion or fundamental situation refers to an ontological 
something and not a metaphysical something. If this 
judgment is accepted then Desan's criticism could be 
dismissed by simply S8lfing that Desan is making a cate-
gorical mistake by trying to make freedom, which belongs 
on the ontological level, the essence or nature of man, 
which rightly belongs on the metaphysical level. 
<!:b 
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to is the essence of man, then he is wrong. In other words, 
that human reality, as Sartre would like to have it anp~ 
(as freedom, as existence) is the essence of man. Desan 
would then be misinterpreting Sartre, for Sartre believes 
this freedom to be bare existence, nothingness, etc., and 
that freedom makes itself a particular freedom by becoming 
or assuming its essence (its being) subsequently. Existence 
precedes essence. This is a probl~n of fact, not of defi-
nition. It is suggested that Desan does not accuse Sartre 
of making freedom, in fact, the essence of man. Hmvever, 
Desan may be saying something very close to this; and this 
is our second consideration. Does our conclusion above, 
that in defining freedom Sartre has made freedom an essence, 
imply that in fact, or in reality, freedom is the essence 
of man. In other words, is a "definitional essence" enough 
to destroy, in fact, freedom as not an essence? Is Sartre's 
dictum, existence precedes essence, actually reduced in fact 
to essence precedes existence just because the former is re-
duced to the latter on a definitional level? This seems to 
be the result of Desan's criticism. If Desan does not mean 
this then his criticism is simply external and superficial. 
It is simply one of definition. But if his criticism is 
what is suggested above, then it is penetrating and sig-
nificant; for it includes the problem not only of trying to 
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talk about something that cannot be defined, but it in-
eludes the claim that a definition modifies, in fact, 
that of vlhich it is a definition. 
The difficulty in interpreting Desen's criticism 
is due partly to the nature of the material to which Desa."l 's 
criticism is directed. Sartre' s philosophy is just plain 
hard to talk about. And it is also due to the lack of 
clarity on the part of Desan. For example, Desan is not 
just saying that essence precedes existence, but that 
essence is logically prior to existence. It is unclear 
what Desan means by logically here. He seems off-hand to 
be making a categorical mistake in saying that essence 
takes logical precedence over existence. And he -vrould be 
making the same mistake if he were to say that existence 
took logical precedence over essence. Desan seems to mean 
by logical essence ttabstract possibility." For Sartre, 
however, essence does not, whether interpreted as prior or 
subsequent to existence, refer to a purely abstract possi-
bility. Yet, Desan is not wholly wrong if he is giving 
ontological status to the abstract or logical category. 
Possibility, in Sartre's philosophy, is not purely logical, 
but ontolo:>,ical. Possibility refers to being and existence, 
and being and existence have ontological status. 
The attempt in this section has not been to re-
solve, in fact, Desan's criticism of Sartre. Our purpose 
has not been nor vlill it be, to say whether Desan is rig..l-J.t 
or 1:lrong. The above considerations have simply been an 
attempt to clarify the confused issues hidden in Desan's 
criticism. It is hoped that the clarification of Desan's 
critic ism shows, first, some of the problems which Sartre' s 
concept of freedom gives rise to and, second, that because 
of the nature of Sartre's philosophy it does not lend itself 
easily to criticism. 
ii. Absolute Freedom 
Sartre' s not ion of freedom is often termed absolute 
freedom and sometimes pure freedom. It may very well be 
a mistake to apply the word absolute to Sartre's notion 
of freedom. Once we term Sartre's freedom absolute it is 
easy to conclude, as Desan has done, that 
there is no unlimited and absolute freedom: either 
freedom limits itself (we are condemned to be free) 
or we are free from all things, even from freedom 
itself. Suicide is proof of the latter, but also 
the end of freedom.l 
The trap Desan is trying to set for Sartre is a trap \vhich 
will catch anybody who advocates a notion of absolute or 
unbounded freedom. Certainly there are restrictions on 
1. Desan, The Tragic Finale, p. 166. 
freedom. But they are implied in the fact of freedom 
itself. It might be suggested that a simile~ contradic-
tion exists when one speaks of absolute equality. If two 
things are absolutely equal they are usually thought of 
as one and the same thing. The "'.vord equality was not 
originally introduced to mean that two things are really 
one thing, but that ~ things have similar capacities, 
accidents, qualities, etc. The word equality loses all 
its intelligible meaning if it does not imply more than 
one. The word equality, by definition, implies that there 
are at least t~vo distinct things. When the notion of 
absolute equality is introduced the meaning of equality 
is expanded to mean that tvw things are so similar that 
they are really one. Hence a contradiction exists. Once 
the word equality is qualified by the word absolute the word 
equality loses its meaning, or in its referring it becomes 
a contradiction. A similar confusion exists when freedom 
is qualified by the word absolute. 
The only restriction on Sartre's freedom is that 
it is a condition of human reality. This condition is a 
restriction simply because it is posited as the fundamental, 
ontological foundation of human reality; thus, man is con-
demned to be free.tt Now if absolute freedom means, as Desan 
says it does, that 11 the climax of freedom is to be free f'rom 
all things except from freedom it self, nl then of course 
Sartre 1 s absolute freedom involves a contradiction; for 
an absolute freedom would mean freedom from all things. 
Desan also says that it is just as fatal for Sartre 1 s 
absolute freedom to say that nthe climax of freedom is to 
be free from all things including freedom itself .n2 In 
this case, one would escape freedom by committing suicide 
and would be absolutely free from all things. According 
to Sartre, when one is dead he no longer possesses free-
dom.3 In short, the concept of absolute freedom is in-
volved in a contradiction; for, according to Desan, absolute 
freedom means freedom from everything, including freedom 
itself, and the only way to achieve the latter is by sui-
cide, and the the meaning of freedom loses all its 
intelligibility in the Sartrian context. 
The simple way to avoid this contradiction from 
arising is to avoid terming Sartre 1 s freedom an absolute 
freedom. vfuen Sartre talks of pure freedom he does not 
mean pure in the sense of absolute, at least to the degree 
which vle spoke of it above. Sartre introduces pure freedom 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid., p. 165. 
Ibid., p. 166. 
See Sartre 1 s discussion, Being and Nothingness, pp. 544-
556. On page 509 Sartre says, "I am never free except 
in situation." For Sartre, death does not constitute 
"in situation.n 
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to distinguish it from freedom of choice. Pure freedom 
is a term vli th a narrower meaning than absolute freedom. 
Pure freedom refers to ontological freedom. And ontological 
freedom refers to being-free. And since being-free in-
cludes its own restriction, that is, being-free (an 
ontological restriction), and since, for Desan, the in-
troduction of any restriction whatsoever is a destruction 
of the notion of absolute freedom, then the best policy 
is simply to avoid applying the notion absolute freedom 
to being-free. Sartre's freedom is probably as "absolute" 
a doctrine of freedom as can be found, since it means free-
dom from all but one thing, namely freedom itself. This 
restriction is not a contradiction in ~~ but a contra-
diction in definition. Avoid defining freedom as absolute 
and we have avoided all contradiction. 
iii. Conclusion 
The exposition above of Desan's tvw criticisms of 
Sartre's doctrine of freedom should be enough to indicate 
that ~hese criticisms imply something far more penetrating 
and fundamental to Sartre's philosophy than the prima facie 
problems raised by the criticisms themselves. The attempt 
above was to tFy to manipulate Desan's criticisms in such 
a way as to make these criticisms questions of definition, 
not of fact. Sartre's philosophy and philosophizing con-
tain an unavoidable conflict, and the nature of this 
conflict is such that it gives rise to the linguistic 
confusions shown above. 
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The unavoidable conflict between Sartre's philosophy 
and philosophizing is the conflict between fact and defi-
nition. It is the conflict between the fact of freedom and 
Sartre's definition of this fact. Freedom, ~fact, is 
indefinable. To even say why it is indefinable is, in 
part, to define,it. Sartre spends 700 plus pages of Being 
and Nothingness telling us not only that freedom is inde-
finable, but \vhat it must be that it cannot be defined. 
De san is right when he says that Sartre has in defining 
freedom made it the essence of man. But he has only made 
it a "definitional essence." And if the distinction be-
tween definition and fact is kept in mind, it cannot be 
hurriedly concluded that freedom is, in fact, the essence 
of man. 
From these considerations the reader can conclude 
one of two things. Either there really is a freedom (in 
fact) which by nature is such that it can not be tal ked 
about or defined and, therefore, one can and will say 
nothing about it, or, if freedom, in fact, cannot be de-
fined, then it does not deserve a place in serious phil-
osophical considerations and study. The latter seems the 
most plausible since Sartre's freedom, in fact, st2nds in 
opposition to freedom defined. In short, the fact of 
o? C7, ' 
freedom does not lend itself to conceptual communication 
and philosophy always presupposes the intelligibility of 
that about which it is talking. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. Sartre' s statement: nNever were we fraer than under 
the German Occupation, tt suggests that tr1e meaning of 
Sartre's doctrine of freedom is .found only_by looking 
at the internal dimension of man. It has been shovm 
that this statement eliminates the possibility of 
interpreting freedom as the lack of physical, social, 
or political restraint. 
2. Sartre' s phenomenology is not only a method vThich 
describes the fact of emotion which appears to con-
sciousness, but a description of the fact of emotion 
is a description, in part, of the .fact of consciousness 
itself. 
3. A consciousness or a will "tvhi ch is free is, first, 
.free because no determining motives affect the activi-
ties of consciousness and, second, free to choose or 
assume the "motive sn which it pleases. 
4. The cardinal activity of consciousness is its inten-
tionality. Consciousness is intentional in the sense 
that consciousness is always consciousness of some-
thing. The Ego may also be this something. Conscious-
ness is always consciousness of its tra~scendent field. 
5. vllien Sartre says that existence or consciousness pre-
cedes essence he is concluding two entirely different 
things. One is the rejection of a Platonic Form or 
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an image in the mind of God v.rhich exists prior to man 
and defines him, i.e., acts as man's essence. Secondly, 
he is accepting the exist en tie~ fact that one 1 s exis-
tence is ontologically prior to one 1 s essence; that 
is, that the being of consciousness precedes the being 
of essence, precisely because the being of conscious-
ness is definad as non-being or nothingness and thus 
consciousness must r:1ak2 it self be. 
6. Freedom has the s~~e ontological status as existence 
or the being of consciousness. Freedom may be identi-
fied with the being of consciousness. Because of 
this identification it can be concluded that the first 
meaning of Sartre's concept of freedom refers to some-
thing v1hich man possesses. This allows Sartre to 
speak of man as ahaving freedom. n I~an is freedom. 
7. The term ontolosical freedom suggests that there is 
no difference between man's being and his being-free. 
8. Not only is Sartre's concept of freedom tied to his 
concept of the being of consciousness, but it is 
similarly tied to his theory of th2 activity of con-
sciousness, namely, intentionality. This allows Sartre 
not only to say that can is a freedom, but that he is 
. ,_) 
a freedom vJhich chooses, that is, a freedom which must 
intend its ovm objects (essence, being-in-it self). 
91 
9. The activity of consciousness may be called free activity 
precisely because it is follovr.i.ng certain determina-
tions. It is following its own determinations or limi-
tations as freedom, as a being which is not enough. 
Free activity does not mean the success in obtaining 
the ends chosen, rather, it means the ability of free-
dom to posit whatever ends it pleases, ~Jhether desirable 
or undesirable. 
10. Freedom can never be enough, for this would mean be-
coming a being-in-itself. And freedom is defined as 
not being a being-in-itself. 
11. Sartre's two meanings of freedom may be summed up in 
the phrase, "having to choose," but only if it is 
kept in mind that freedom means "having" and freedom 
means "choosing." 
12. ~ilfrid_Desan has objected that Sartre has made free-
dom itself into an essence and that this is the very 
thing Sartre has tried to avoid. This thesis concluded 
that only ih defining freedom has Sartre made freedom 
an essence. Thus he has made fr8edom an essence only 
if one identifies the notion of man 1 s ontolor.;ical 
nconditionn with the tradition2.l notion of man's 
fundamental "nature.'' Sartre has not made freedom the 
the essence of man as long as the word essence is inter-
preted as a being which is. 
13. The objection that Sartre's freedom is a doctrine of 
"absoluten freedom and therefore results in a contra-
diction since absolute freedom means unlimited and 
Sartre's freedom is limited by itself may be escaped 
by simply not applying the word "absolute to Sertre' s 
notion of freedom. This is a sensible approach be-
cause Sartre himself recognizes that freedom is limited 
by itself and thus never applies Desan's interpretation 
of the word absolute to his doctrine of freedom. 
14. Sartre's philosophy and philosophizing contain an 
unavoidable conflict. It is the conflict between fact 
and definition. It is the conflict between the fact 
of freedom and Sartre's definition of this fact. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an exposi-
tion and internretation of Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of 
freedom, as expressed in his major philosophical writings. 
This purpose calls for a consideration of the relationship" 
betv1een freedom and some of Sartre' s other basic ontological 
concepts. The notner" :once-pts are those relating specifically 
to Sartre's theor'J cf consciousness. To explore and make 
ex"Jlicit the fundar:1ental struct'J.res of consciousness is to 
take the front door into an underst3llding of Sartre' s con-
cept of freedom. 
Chapter II sho·us that t.'l. e r:.e an.ing of 3artre' s con-
cept of freedo::-.1 v.i.dely diverges from various traditional 
and popular interpretaticnsof freedo~. It is concluded 
that the term freedom is intimately bound up ~dth Sartre's 
conception of consciousness an:i that a consciousness t·thich 
is free is, first, free because no determining motives affect 
the activities of consciousness a.11d, second, consciousness 
is able to choose the nmotivesrr T,-rhich it pleases. In Chap-
ter III it is learned thc:,t the cardinal activity of con-
sciousness is its inte~1.tio~J..s.lit=r, t'c:5.t consciousness is 
al':.Jeys co::1scious ness of so;;:et:-:.i:1C. ·:;:~!.8 dis ~inction is nade 
between refl3ctive and pre-reflect~ve consciousness. It is 
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further indicated in this chapter Sartre' s rejection of a 
transcendental unifying and indivicm~~izing Ego and his 
replacement of it with a transcendent ~go, vvhich, for 
Sartre, becomes an object for consciousness like any other 
object. In Chapter IV Sartre's ontoloGJ is developed by 
96 
an analysis of all that ~>thich is not consciousness, or in 
Sartre' s terminology, a b eL1g-in-i t self. The in-it self is 
any transcendent object and its beinc; is characterized by a 
massive, :::~ull identity 1.vith itself; being-in-itself is self-
consistent, uncreated, and neither passivity nor activity. 
In Chapter V consciousness is ide~1tified with being-for-
itself. Being-for-itself is empty of content, must make 
itself be, is its own nothingness, and introduces negations 
and tEmporality into the 1·rorld. Consciousness •.vill never 
be what it lacks, for its being lies outside, at a distance, 
and beyond; it is defined as not being that being. Ontolo-· 
gically spe~~ing, man's being is nothingness. 
Chapter VI identifies Sartre's notion of freedom 
with the being of consciousness. Thus one meaning of Sartre's 
notion of freedom tak2s on an ontological dim·~nsion; man is 
freedom. The other r1eaning of freedom is assigned to the 
necessary activity of consciousness. This activity is 
characterized by the necessary, unceasing, yet interminable, 
desire of conscicusne ss to choose or assume its own being, 
its essence. It has been objected by Wilfrid Desan that 
Sartre has Y.J.ade freedom itself into the essence of man. 
This thesis concludes, however, that only in defining 
freedom has Sartre made freedom an essence. Even in this 
sense, Sartre has made freedom an essence only if one is 
willing to identify r~c:m 's ontological "condition" with the 
traditional notion of a fundamental "nature 11 of man. De san 
further objects that Sartre' s notion of "absolute" freedom 
results in a contr2.diction since &bsolute 1neans unlimited, 
and Sartre's freedom is limited by freedom itself. The 
thesis concludes that this contradiction may be avoided 
by simply refraining from calling Se~tre's concept of free-
dom "absolute1' and accepting, along vli th Sartre, the exis-
tential condition-that freedom is limited by one thing, 
namely, freedom it self. A final critical evalue~tion is 
made concerning the unavoidable conflict between Sartre' s 
philosophy 2nd philosophizing. It is asserted that this 
conflict is a conflict between fact and definition. It is 
the conflict between the fact of freedom a..'1d Sartre' s 
definition of this fact. 
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